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UNTANGLING THE WEB OF MUSIC
COPYRIGHTS
Lydia Pallas Lorent
"It's as if Franz Kafka designed this system and employed Rube
Goldberg as his architect."
- Rob Glaser,' Chairman, MusicNet
INTRODUCTION

The music industry is in crisis. Infringement is rampant, with
little sign of abating. 2 Despite lawsuits against peer-to-peer file
sharing systems, 3 new systems arise faster than old ones are shut
down.4 Consumers are ripping and burning CDs with little regard
for music copyright.5

t Associate Professor Law, Lewis and Clark Law School. I thank Case Western Reserve
University School of Law for the opportunity to develop and present the ideas in this Paper at
the conference Reflections on Tasini and Beyond in November 2002, the commentators at that
conference: Mark Avsec, David 0. Carson, Elissa Hecker, and Michael Madison, and particularly Craig Nard the organizer of that conference. I am greatly appreciative of the feedback I
received on drafts of this paper from Stacey Dogan, Joe Miller, Doug Litowitz, and Phil Weiser.
I also thank Cyrus Christenson for his able research assistance in the preparation of this article.
Copyright 2002, Lydia Loren.
I Amy Harmon, Copyright Hurdles Confront Selling of Music on the Internet, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 23, 2002, at CI.
2 Hilary Rosen, Chairman and CEO of the Recording Industry Association of America,
claims the most popular network, KaZaA, boasts on its site that its file-sharing software has
been downloaded more than 120 million times, and that it is estimated that more than 2.6 billion
files are copied every month. IntellectualProperty Theft Online: Hearing on H.R. 5211 Before
the House Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet and Intellectual Prop. on the Judiciary Comm.,
107th Cong., Fed. Document Clearing House Cong. Testimony, (Sept. 26, 2002), available at
http://www.riaa.org/PRstory.cfm?id=559. Thirty million consumers use file sharing services
such as KaZaA and Morpheus, two of the bigger content-swapping networks since Napster's
demise. Music to Their Ears, THE ECONOMIST, Sept. 21, 2002, at 12.
3 See A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 284 F.3d 1091 (9th Cir. 2002).
4 See, e.g., John Borland, Another File-swapping Site to Fall Silent, CNET NEWS.COM,
Sept. 4, 2002, at http://news.com.com/2100-1023-956644.htm (noting that the shutdown of
Aimster may have little effect on file sharing because "[t]he vast majority of file-traders have
migrated to other platforms such as Kazaa, StreamCast Networks' Morpheus, or iMesh").
5 Indeed this author is often confronted with individuals in social settings who begin
recounting their ripping and burning activities, to her great discomfort. Yet there are not adequate altematives for this author to suggest authorized ways to obtain what these individuals
seek - access to digital files of individual recordings.
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How has the industry responded? The industry has sought
stronger laws, 6 stiffer penalties, 7 and legal protection for technological protections they might employ to stem the tide of copying.8
Music industry players have also sought to impose royalties at levels that have shutdown many downstream users who seek to stay
within the bounds of the law. 9 Even ventures backed by the major
record companies are having a difficult time getting off the
ground.10
The industry is headed in the wrong direction. The copyright
system is broken. Merely retooling it will not work. What is
needed is a redesign. This Article identifies two fundamental aspects of the 1976 Copyright Act that should be altered if copyright
for music 'is to survive the digital revolution." While this Article
focuses on the music industry because the problems are particu6 One example of additional protection sought is H.R. 5211, introduced July 25, 2002.
This legislation is intended to assist copyright owners in battling infringement that occurs
through peer-to-peer filing sharing on the Internet. This legislation would exempt copyright
owners from criminal and civil liability for "disabling, interfering with, blocking, diverting, or
otherwise impairing the unauthorized distribution, display, performance, or reproduction of his
or her copyrighted work on a publicly accessible peer-to-peer file trading network, if such impairment does not, without authorization, alter, delete, or otherwise impair the integrity of any
computer file or data residing on the computer of a file sharer." H.R. 5211, 107th Cong.
(2002).
7 See, e.g., Digital Theft Deterrence and Copyright Damages Improvement Act of 1999,
Pub. L. No. 106-160, § 1, 113 Stat. 1774 (1999) (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 504
(2000)); No Electronic Theft (NET) Act, Pub. L. No. 105-147, 111 Stat. 2678 (1997).
8 See Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860, Title I
(1998) (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1204 (2000)).
9 See Evan Hansen, Webcasters Sound offon Net Radio Fees, CNET.NEwS.COM (Oct. 1,
2002), at http://news.com.com/2100-1023-960336.html (discussing the challenges faced by
Webcasters attempting to reform the royalty rates for receiving music on the internet).
10 See Harmon, supra note 1.
I Survival is at stake. Scholars and others are beginning to seriously question the need
for copyright protection when the costs of distributing creative works are very low and can be
born, in large measure, by the users of those works. See, e.g., Raymond Shih Ray Ku, The
Creative Destruction of Copyright: Napster and the New Economics of Digital Technology, 69
U. CHI. L. REV. 263 (2002) (arguing that "the economics of digital technology renders copyright both unnecessary and inefficient."); see also Tom W. Bell, Escapefrom Copyright: Market
Success vs. Statutory Failure in the Protection of Expressive Works, 69 U. CIN. L. REV. 741
(2001); John Perry Barlow, The Economy ofIdeas, WIRED (Mar. 1994) (concluding that intellectual property law is flawed and that a new set of methods should be developed to deal with
the challenges posed by the Digitial Age). These arguments stand on the shoulders of skepticism about the need for copyright protection that antedates the digital age. See, e.g., Stephen
Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of Copyright in Books, Photocopies, and
ComputerPrograms, 84 HARV. L. REV. 281 (1970).
Professor Bell also argues that the increasing global population and the possibilities for
extremely low cost global distribution cut in favor of eliminating copyright. Tom W. Bell,
Copyright and Population, Sept. 17, 2002, at http://www.tomwbell.com/writings/(C)&Pop.html.
Others argue that the use of technological protections and other forms of trusted systems may
negate the need for copyright. See, e.g., Eric Schlachter, The IntellectualProperty Renaissance
in Cyberspace: Why Copyright Law Could Be Unimportant on the Internet, 12 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 15, 38 (1997).
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larly pronounced in that industry, the proposals for reform are applicable to other categories of copyrighted works.
The crisis in the music industry has been brought about only
in part by the digital revolution. The layering of copyright ownership interests and the complexity of copyright law, particularly as
it applies to music, has played a major role in the inability of the
industry to respond to the changing nature of the ways in which
digital works can be distributed and otherwise exploited. The layering of copyright interests and the complexity of the law began
long before digital technology. Digital technology, however, has
laid bare the flaws of the current system that have been created by
a process of accretion.
The Supreme Court's recent opinion in New York Times Co.
Inc. v. Tasini,12 highlights the emphasis the 1976 Copyright Act
placed on the author of a copyrighted work. In many different
provisions of the 1976 Act the author is given protection against
certain rules from the 1909 Act that were seen as unfair. 13 In particular, many of these rules related to the relationship between author and publisher/distributor. However, in the digital era, the role
of the publisher/distributor may be significantly reduced.' 4 The
complicated web of legal rights and vested industry players in the
field of music exemplifies the extreme to which the focus on authors' rights can lead. Unfortunately, in the context of digital distribution, many of the provisions that were meant to provide a
end up bepreference for the author over the publisher/distributor
15
public.
the
over
author
the
for
ing a preference
The fundamental purpose of copyright law is to promote the
progress of knowledge and learning. Thus, examining the reasons
to provide a preference for the author over the public becomes
critical. Some level of protection is needed in order to provide an
incentive for the creation and distribution of works of authorship.
How much protection is the fundamental question. When elements
533 U.S. 483 (2001).
In establishing the rules allocating rights among various potential recipients, the 1976
Copyright Act evidences a preference for authors' rights in many different provisions. Tasini
involved the preference for the author in the context of contributions to collective works. Id.
The termination of grant provisions constitute significant additional evidence of this preference
for the author. 17 U.S.C. § 203 (2002). The preference for authors' rights was further solidified
in the elimination of formalities as a prerequisite for protection. Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100- 568, 102 Stat. 2853 (1988). Seen as a trap for the unwary,
unsophisticated author, this act eliminated the notice requirement for published works. Subsequently, Congress eliminated the registration required in order to have protection extending
beyond an initial twenty-eight year tenn. Copyright Renewal Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-307,
106 Stat. 264 (1992) (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 304 (2000)).
14 See Ku, supra note 11, at 300-05.
15 The international copyright treaties are similarly focused on the author.
12
13
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of the copyright system hinder dissemination of copyrighted works
without providing adequate benefits to the creators or distributors
of works, those elements of the system should be eliminated. The
Copyright Act is no longer responsive to the reality of the digital
world. Many of its provisions create obstacles to both widespread
dissemination and compensation to the author in order to continue
to provide the incentive necessary to stimulate the creation of new
works. 16
The fast paced world of digital delivery of music needs to
have a different structure for facilitating downstream use 17 and for
assuring compensation to authors. That structure must significantly reduce transaction costs, which are particularly high in the
music industry. In a world in which the speed of delivery is measured not in days or weeks but in seconds and fractions thereof,
these high transaction costs created by the current structure of the
1976 Act impose serious obstacles for achieving the goal of copyright. Additionally, the delay, and oftentimes the outright failure,
in obtaining legal clearance for certain activities merely results in
more demand for unauthorized channels of distribution. The peerto-peer file sharing phenomenon exemplifies this pattern. While
legal regulation can create transaction costs, regulation can also
reduce transaction costs. In the world of copyrights in general,
and music copyrights in particular, the current regulation adds significantly to the transaction costs.
This Article does not suggest eliminating copyright protection, although there are scholars presently heading down that
path.' 8 Instead, using the music industry as an example, this Article argues that the 1976 Act should be revised in certain fundamental ways. The proposed revisions do not provide a complete
solution to the current problems facing the music industry. Instead
the revisions primarily are meant to prepare copyright law to address future innovations in technologies by enhancing the ability
of copyright owners, particularly in the music industry, to quickly
embrace new methods for exploiting their works.

16 See Kimberly L. Craft, The Webcasting Music Revolution is Ready to Begin, as Soon as
We Figure Out the Copyright Law: The Story of the Music Industry at War with Itself, 24 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 1 (2001) (arguing that the major industry players' constant fighting, in
and out of court, leaves behind the artists and consumers as casualties).
17 Throughout this Article "downstream use" refers to the variety of activities that may be
engaged in by many different users; from the individual who engages in file sharing through
peer-to-peer technology, to the webcasting radio stations that stream music to users, all are
downstream users. As used in this Article, "downstream use" does not involve the creation of
new derivative works.
1S See supra note 11.
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Part I of this Article is descriptive, exploring the tangle of legal rights in the music industry and identifying the vested industry
players and their respective roles. Part II explains why the structure of the music industry and the interplay between the vested
industry players has led to the current crisis, as digital delivery and
digital broadcasting begin to dominate the distribution methods
and broadcasting means. This part of the Article describes the
problems faced by users of new technology in attempting to comply with the law. These problems may explain, at least in part, the
widespread phenomenon of what many in the industry see as infringement on a massive, and global, scale. Without lowtransaction-cost solutions and reasonable absolute prices for obtaining authorization for the digital activities of millions of users,
we see a classic example of market failure. Users respond to this
failure by effectively exiting the failed market, completely ignoring the overly cumbersome requirements of the law. 19
After identifying the appropriate goals of the copyright law,
Part III proposes concrete changes that should be implemented in
the new Copyright Act. First, the new Copyright Act should embrace derivative work independence, a doctrine rejected in 1990 by
the Supreme Court in Stewart v. Abend.20 This would eliminate
the problems resulting from the dual layers of copyright ownership
in a final product utilized by downstream listeners. If there is only
one copyright owner from which downstream users may obtain
complete authorization to use the work, transaction costs will be
significantly reduced. For such a consolidation to be effective,
however, two additional changes are necessary. First, as explained
in Part III.B.2, the compulsory mechanical license for musical
works, codified in section 115 of the Copyright Act, must be repealed. Second, as detailed in Part III.B.3, sound recording copyright owners must be granted rights equal to those of musical work
copyright owners. This package of three changes constitutes a significant revision in the structure of rights in the music industry, but
would result in a more efficient market for downstream use.
Part III also recommends altering the manner in which the
rights are granted to copyright owners. Currently section 106
grants different rights that are divisible into different types of uses,
e.g., reproduction, derivative work creation, public distribution,

19 Many, in fact, find it hard to believe that the law actually forbids what they are doing.
See JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT 112-14 (2001). This can be particularly true if the
user is not making any money in their activities or paying any money to engage in the activity.
20 495 U.S. 207 (1990).
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public performance, and public display.2 1 In the music industry,
copyright owners have assigned or exclusively licensed these separate rights to different industry players, dividing these legal entitlements and causing a fractionation of rights in a single copyrighted work. The creation of multiple owners 22 would not be a
problem if a downstream user's use clearly implicated only one
right. However, as detailed in Part II, in the digital realm, each of
the owners claims that a variety of, uses implicates her rights and
thus requires her permission. If, instead, the author were granted a
unified right to "commercially exploit the expression," we would
not have the same problems associated with industry players building up vested interests around different statutory rights and then
causing trouble when distribution technology changes and each
industry player asserts a right to obtain royalties for the new methods of exploitation. Such a statutory change would take time to
influence contracting behavior, but would hopefully create vested
industry players divided by logical markets, rather than clustered
around the different statutory rights granted to the copyright
owner.
Finally, Part III explores the problems associated with industry consolidation and the existing and potential mechanisms to reduce the negative effects of the present consolidation. While provisions can be included in the Copyright Act to curb the abusive
use of market power, copyright law's experience with one such
provision is, in part, what has led to the complicated nature of the
industry.
While this Article focuses on music copyrights, there are lessons to be learned for other kinds of works as well. To suggest it
is time for a revision of the 1976 Act may be shocking, but as
demonstrated in Part I and explained in Part II of this Article, significant action is needed. The process of tinkering at the margins

21 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2000). While owners of all copyrighted works are granted the right to
reproduce the work in copies, distribute the work to the public, and prepare derivative works,
section 106(l)-(3), not all works are granted the right to public display or publicly perform the
work, section 106(4)-(5), and one category of copyrightable works, sound recordings, are
granted the right to publicly perform the work only by means of a digital audio transmission,
section 106(6). The reasons for and the effects of this more limited public performance right for
sound recordings are explored below. See discussion infra Sections 1G, III.B.3.
22 Even exclusive licensees are considered "transferees" of copyright. 17 U.S.C. §
201(d)(2) (2000). All transferees, including exclusive licensees have the full rights of a copyright owner, including standing to bring a lawsuit. This is achieved through the definitions of
"transfer of copyright ownership" and "copyright owner" in section 101, and the provisions of
section 501 reinforced by section 201 (d)(2). Roger D. Blair & Thomas F. Cotter, The Elusive
Logic of Standing Doctrine in Intellectual -Property Law, 74 TUL. L. REV. 1323, 1367-70
(2000).
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each time a new technological development occurs 23 has led to a
cumbersome and complicated set of rules that creates significant
obstacles to dissemination rather than facilitating such dissemination. Only by examining the system fresh, identifying the goals
and the impediments to those goals, and then starting with a clean
slate, can we untangle the complicated web of legal entitlements
that currently exist.
I.

THE TANGLED WEB OF MUSIC COPYRIGHT

The world of music copyrights is one of the most complicated
areas within copyright law. The complexity stems from the historical development of the music industry and the corresponding
process of regulation through accretion that responded to the
changes in the industry. For the uninitiated, examining the copyright owners, the rights granted to them, and the vested industry
players that seized on those rights in chronological fashion is often
the most coherent way to understand the current legal landscape.
A.

In the Beginning - The Musical Work Copyright

The story really begins in 1831 when Congress added musical
compositions to the categories of copyrightable works. 24 Musical
work copyright owners were granted the same rights as any copyright owner, which, at the time, consisted of "the sole right and
liberty of printing, reprinting, publishing, and vending" the copyrighted work.25 For musical works this was almost exclusively
accomplished through the sales of sheet music. At this time, there
existed three major interested parties in the copyrighted musical
works. First there were the composers, the authors of the musical
compositions to whom the Copyright Act granted copyright protection. Next there were the music publishers who would purchase
the copyrights from the composers, either for a lump sum or for
running royalty payments, and would exercise the rights of the
copyright owner. Finally, there was the consumer who would pay
the purchase price to obtain a copy of the musical composition in
sheet music form. The consumer could then learn and perform the
musical work. In reality, there were other interested parties,
namely the rest of the public who would have the opportunity to
hear the music played by someone reading the sheet music, but in
23 By "tinkering" I do not mean to suggest that the new legal rules
adopted do not have
significant effect, but merely that these laws add layers of complication onto an already overly
complex set of rules.
24 Act of Mar. 3, 1897, ch. 392, 29 Stat. 694.
25

Id.
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the 1800s such a public performance of a musical composition did
not implicate any rights granted to the copyright owner.
The landscape remained in this relatively uncomplicated state
for several decades, resembling the print publishing industry for
novels or other books: a three way triangular relationship among
authors, distributors, and consumers. The 1909 Copyright Act
added the right to "arrange or adapt" to the rights granted to a
copyright owner of a musical work.2 6 Along with the rights of
printing and vending the musical composition in sheet music, music publishers, as assignees of the composers' copyrights, controlled the making of adaptations of that musical work with one
major exception: the 1909 Act subjected the right to control the
creation and distribution of "mechanica[l]" copies to a compulsory
license. 27 This statutory innovation became a significant factor in
the structure of the music industry and is explored in Section I.B,
below.
The rights of reproduction, distribution, and derivation continue to be part of the Copyright Act today. Music publishers continue to be important industry players in the legal landscape of
music copyrights, and their trade association, the National Music
Publishers Association, remains a powerful lobbying force in Congress and throughout the industry.
B.

ComplicationsBegin - Compulsory Licensingfor Mechanical
Reproductions

As mentioned in the previous section, the legal landscape
concerning music copyrights took its first turn towards complexity
in the 1909 Act in response to the player piano industry and the
28
Supreme Court's opinion in White Smith v. Apollo Music. In that
case, the Supreme Court determined that player piano rolls did not
constitute reproductions of musical compositions and therefore
were not infringing upon the copyright owners' rights in those
compositions. Player piano rolls were made without copying the
actual notes on staff paper, but rather by having perforations in the
rolls that mechanically caused notes to be played on the piano as
the rolls rotated. In White Smith the Court ruled that these roles
were not "copies" of the copyrighted musical composition but
29 Because no copies
rather were component parts of machines.
26 Act of Feb. 3, 1831, 4 Stat. 36.
27 Id. § 1(e).

28 209 U.S. 1 (1908).
29 Id. at 18. Justice Holmes, in his concurring opinion in the case, anticipated congressional repudiation of the Court's holding. Id. at 19-20.
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were made by the manufacturers of these roles, there was no infringement.
Congress overturned the result in White Smith in the 1909
Act, specifically granting to musical work copyright owners the
right to control the "mechanical reproduction" of their works,
thereby encompassing the player piano rolls as infringements of
the musical composition copyright. The story does not end there,
however, as Congress was suspicious of the market power of one
piano roll company, the Aeolian Company. 3' To avoid the evils
that monopolization in the industry might bring, Congress subjected the mechanical reproduction right to a compulsory license
system. 32 This licensing system allowed any manufacturer of piano rolls to use any musical composition without negotiating with
the copyright owner for permission, so long as the musical work
had been previously licensed to someone else for mechanical reproduction, and the manufacturer paid a statutory royalty. Thus,
once the Aeolian Company (or any other company) had negotiated
the right to reproduce a musical composition in "mechanical copies," any one else could, upon payment of the statutory royalty,
produce their own piano rolls of that musical composition. The
statutory royalty rate was initially set at two cents per mechanical
copy distributed.3 3
The compulsory license for mechanical reproductions of musical works, sometimes called simply "mechanicals," remains a
part of the Copyright Act today and is applicable not just to player
piano rolls, but also to CDs, cassettes, and any other "phonorecord" that mechanically reproduces the musical work. Currently
codified in section 115 of the Copyright Act, the compulsory license allows recording artists to record what are commonly known
in the industry as "covers" - musical works written by someone
else and previously released on an album by a different recording
artist. Section 115 retains the requirement that the musical work
must have been previously distributed to the public, embodied in a
phonorecord created under the authority of the copyright owner.34
The compulsory license even allows for a new arrangement of the
work to conform it to the style of the recording artist, 35 but does
3 Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, § 1(b), 35 Stat. 1075.
31 PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT'S HIGHWAY: THE LAW AND LORE OF COPYRIGHT FROM
GUTENBERG TO THE CELESTIAL JUKEBOX 65-67 (1994).
32

Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, § l(e), 35 Stat. 1075.

33 Id.
34 17 U.S.C. § 115(a)(1) (2000).
35 This permissible new arrangement is expressly excluded from obtaining protection as a

derivative work, unless the entity creating the new arrangement obtains the consent of the copyright owner. Id. § 115(a)(2).
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not allow for a change in the "basic melody or fundamental character of the work." 3 The Copyright Office periodically updates
the statutory royalty rate, which for phonorecords made and distributed after January 1, 2002, is eight cents per phonorecord or
1.55 cents per minute of playing time or fraction thereof, whichever is greater. 37 This royalty is owed for each copy manufactured
and distributed, regardless of whether the copy is sold or given
away for free.
Most creators of phonorecords, however, do not use the compulsory license mechanism to obtain permission to use musical
works. In 1927 the National Music Publishers Company created
the Harry Fox Agency, a wholly owned subsidiary, to issue and
administer mechanical licenses. Today, most mechanical licenses
are obtained through the Harry Fox Agency. 38 The Harry Fox
Agency has authority to issue licenses only for those musical
works for which Harry Fox has been granted authority by the
copyright owner to act on the copyright owner's behalf. However,
the number of copyright owners that have entered into such
agreements is staggering: Harry Fox represents over 27,000 music
publishers, who in turn represent the interests of more than
160,000 songwriters, 39 who own more than 2.5 million copyrighted
musical works.4 °
While the creators of most sound recordings do not utilize the
statutory provisions for the compulsory mechanical license, the
availability of such a license does affect the rate paid under a license granted by Harry Fox and the terms of the license. The parties to the licenses administered by Harry Fox are negotiating in
the shadow of the compulsory license that both parties know could

36

Id.

37 37 C.F.R. § 255.3(k) (1998). On January 1, 2004, the rate will increase to 8.5 cents per

phonorecord or 1.65 cents per minute. The responsibility for setting rates lies with an arbitration panel, known as a Copyright Arbitration Royalty Panel or CARP. 17 U.S.C. § 115(c)(3)(D)
(2000).
38 The preference for obtaining licenses from Harry Fox instead of utilizing the statutory
license is largely due to the reduction of transaction costs offered by Harry Fox. Harry Fox does
not require monthly reports and royalty payments as required by the Copyright Office, using
instead quarterly or semi-annual reports and payments.
39 Music Publishers Support Landmark Accord with Record Industry For Launch of Internet Subscription Services (Nov. 27, 2001), at http://www.nmpa.orglpr/intemet subscription.
html.
40 Subcommittee on Courts, The Internet and Intellectual Property Of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. (May 17, 2001) (testimony of National Music Publishers'
Association), aVailable at http://www.house.gov/judiciary/stoller_051701.htm.
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be used instead.4 1 Thus, for example, it is rare that the agreed license rate exceeds the rate set by the Copyright Office.4 2
The mechanical license remains an important part of the
Copyright Act today. Its existence has shaped almost a century of
development in the music industry, facilitating the wide availability of remakes of classic tunes. Likewise, the Harry Fox Agency
continues to be a vested party in the legal landscape of music
copyrights.
C. Another ImportantRight - The GeneralPublic Performance
Right
In 1897 Congress granted copyright owners of musical compositions the right to control the public performance of their works
and even made such performances, if engaged in willfully and for
profit, a crime. 43 The 1909 Act continued the tradition of acknowledging a public performance right, although it limited the
scope of the right to only those performances engaged in for
profit.44 It was not until the 1976 Copyright Act that the for-profit
limitation was removed.4 5
While musical composition copyright owners were granted a
public performance right in 1897, it was not until almost 20 years
later that copyright owners began to capitalize on the revenue potential of the public performance right. The problem was really
two fold. First, musical work copyright owners needed to establish what it meant for a performance to be "for profit." Second,
musical composition copyright owners had to overcome the problem of transaction costs in collecting licensing fees for such performances.
In 1913 a group of nine music business leaders, including attorney Nathan Burkan, established the American Society of Composers, Authors, and Publishers (ASCAP).46 In the beginning,
ASCAP encountered resistance from business owners who did not
believe that the use of music in their businesses constituted a "for
profit" use because patrons or customers were not charged a sepa41 Robert P. Merges, Contracting into Liability Rules: Intellectual Property Rights and
Collective Rights Organizations,84 CAL. L. REV. 1293, 1310 (1996).
42 Id. at 1310-11. It is also rare that a mechanical license that falls within the requirements of the statutory license is refused by Harry Fox or by the copyright owner of the musical
work.
43 Act of Jan. 6, 1897, ch. 4, 29 Stat. 481-82, amended by Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, §
25, 35 Stat. 1081.

" Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, § 1(e), 35 Stat. 1075.
45 For an excellent account of this fundamental change, see Jessica Litman, Copyright,
Compromise, and Legislative History, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 857, 883-89 (1987).
46 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 31, at 68.
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rate admission fee to hear the music. The music was only used as
background or for creating ambiance. In 1914, ASCAP filed suit
against the operator of a restaurant in a hotel at which an orchestra
played in the background. The case proceeded to the Supreme
Court which unanimously agreed with ASCAP's arguments and
established the precedent ASCAP needed in order to began collecting royalties in earnest.47
Once it had been established that performances were "for
profit" even if no separate fee was charged to listen to that music,
musical work copyright owners needed to overcome the second
obstacle: transaction costs. While many businesses were engaging
in for profit performances of musical compositions, the cost of collecting licensing fees was prohibitively expensive for any single
copyright owner. ASCAP, acting as a collective rights organization (CRO),48 offered to license thousands of musical compositions
for public performances under blanket license agreements. For
business owners, these blanket licenses significantly reduced the
transaction costs involved in complying with the requirements of
the Copyright Act. For copyright owners, signing up with ASCAP
meant obtaining a share of the royalties collected under these
blanket licenses and therefore effectively capitalizing on the public
performance right granted to them by the Act, a right that previously had not been of much value.
The advent and rapid rise to popularity of the radio, coupled
with ASCAP's attempt to continually raise the royalty rates
charged to the radio stations, led to the formation of another CRO,
Broadcast Music, Inc. (BMI). 49 Today, BMI, in affiliation with
over sixty foreign performing rights organizations, represents the

47 Herbert v. Shanley, 242 U.S. 591 (1917). The Court held:

If the rights under the copyright are infringed only by a performance
where money is taken at the door, they are very imperfectly protected...
. The defendants' performances are not eleemosynary. They are part of a
total for which the public pays, and the fact that the price of the whole is
attributed to a particular item which those present are expected to order,
is not important. It is true that the music is not the sole object, but neither is the food, which probably could be got cheaper elsewhere. The
object is a repast in surroundings that to people having limited powers of
conversation, or disliking the rival noise, give a luxurious pleasure not to
be had from eating a silent meal. If music did not pay, it would be given
up. If it pays, it pays out of the public's pocket. Whether it pays or not,
the purpose of employing it is profit, and that is enough.
Id. at 594-95.
48 Often ASCAP is referred to as a "performance rights organization" (PRO). Because
this articles explores more than just the performance right, the more general phrase "collective
rights organization" (CRO) is used, although ASCAP only licenses performance rights.
49 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 31, at 74.
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copyright holders of nearly 4.5 million musical works. ° One other
CRO, the Society of European Stage Authors and Composes
(SESAC), was formed in 1930. Each of the CROs can only license
public performances of musical works which are under contract
with that CRO. Thus, to be able to play a wide array of musical
works, businesses must obtain contracts with all three of these
CROs, still a vastly better position than having to obtain permission from each individual musical work copyright owner.
The practice of pooling thousands of copyrighted musical
works and then offering blanket licenses did not go unnoticed by
the Antitrust Division of the U.S. Justice Department. Lawsuits
asserting violations of antitrust laws led to consent decrees that
remain in force today, governing aspects of both ASCAP and BMI
licensing practices.51 One of the requirements of those consent
decrees is that a potential licensee may apply to a federal court for
a binding determination of "reasonable" fees in the event that the
licensee and the CRO cannot come to an agreement on the fee to
be paid.52
The public performance right for musical works remains a
significant part of our Copyright Act today. Public performances
of musical works can be accomplished in many ways: live musical
performances, playing pre-recorded music on a stereo system,
broadcasting music on the radio or television, and even turning on
a broadcast in an area open to the public or where a significant
number of people are gathered. Although various exceptions to
the public performance right have been enacted,53 ASCAP and
BMI continue to be significant industry players in the legal landscape of music copyrights, offering licenses to an extremely wide
array of downstream users. The National Association of Broadcasters (NAB), the trade association for over-the-air radio and
television broadcasters, also continues to play a significant role in
the music industry.

50 BMI Celebrates Urban Music At 2002 Awards Ceremony; Top Urban Songwriters,
Producers, Publishers Honored; Godfather of Soul Receives BMI Icon Award, (Aug. 7, 2002),
available at http://press.bmi.com/press-releases/200208/urbanrelease.doc.
51 Michael A. Einhom, Intellectual Property and Antitrust: Music Performing Rights in
Broadcasting, 24 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 349 (2001); see also Simon H. Rifind, Music
Copyrights and Antitrust: A Turbulent Courtship, 4 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1 (1985).
52 The requirements of certain aspects of the consent decree are now codified
in the Copyright Act. 17 U.S.C. § 513 (2000).
53 See, e.g., id. § 110 (outlining "[flimitations on exclusive rights: Exemption
of certain
performances and displays").
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Adding to the Layers of Copyright- Sound Recording
Copyrights

54
The first recorded sounds occurred in the late 1800s, followed by the introduction of the first commercial "victrola" phonograph machine in 1906.. While some states specifically recognized a state-law copyright in sound recordings, it was not until
1971 that Congress granted federal copyright protection for these
works.5 6 Under the terminology employed by the Copyright Act,
all other copyrighted works are fixed in "copies," but sound recordings are fixed in "phonorecords," which the Copyright Act
defines as: "material objects in which sounds, other than those accompanying a motion picture or other audiovisual work, are fixed
by any method now known or later developed, and from which the
sounds can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated,
57 Thus,
either directly or with the aid of a machine or device.,
phonorecords include vinyl albums, cassettes, and CDs, as well as
digital files, such as MP3s, in which sounds are fixed.
This new layer of copyright protection is separate from the
protection granted to any musical work that may also be reproduced in a sound recording. The sound recording copyright protects the elements of original authorship that inhere in a sound recording, whether it is a recording of a musical performance, the
reading of a book, or the sounds of railroad whistles. Within the
music industry, the copyrights in sound recordings are typically
owned by the record labels. This ownership is accomplished
through work for hire and assignment agreements from recording
artists. In the realm of record labels, five companies dominate the
scene. 58 All of the major record labels and some of the smaller
labels are members of the trade association, the Record Industry
Association of American (RIAA), a group with significant influ59
ence in the music industry and in Congress.
When sound recordings were first added to the Copyright Act
as a category of protectable works in 1971, Congress limited the
rights granted to these new copyright owners in significant ways.
54 Thomas Edison invented the basic technology of the phonograph in 1877. Jeffery A.
Abrahamson, Tuning Up for a New Musical Age: Sound Recording Copyright Protection in a

Digital Environment, 25 AIPLA Q.J. 181, 188 (1997).
55 Mary Seelhorst, The Progressives,POPULAR MECHANICS, June 2000, at 101.
56 Act of Oct. 15, 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-140, 85 Stat. 391 (effective Feb. 15, 1972).
57 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000).
58 The record companies are referred to as the "big five": Universal Music Group, Sony
Music Entertainment, EMI Group, Warner Brothers Music, and BMG Entertainment.
59 RIAA boosts that its "members create, manufacture and/or distribute approximately
90% of all legitimate sound recordings produced and sold in the United States." RIAA, Mission
Statement, at http://www.riaa.com/about-who.cfm (last visited December 28, 2002).
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For purposes of this Article, the most important limitation was that
sound recording copyright owners were not granted a right to control the public performance of their works. As the 1976 Act was
nearing passage, the initial draft of the Senate bill sought to
change that by including a full public performance right for sound
recording copyright owners with a compulsory licensing system
similar to that for mechanical reproductions of musical works. 60
Opposition from broadcasters, performing rights societies, and
music publishers helped to defeat these provisions. In the end, the
1976 Act did not include a public performance right for sound recordings.61
Broadcaster opposition was understandable: they did not desire to pay new royalties for activities that they had been engaged
in for decades. However, it is worth pausing to consider why the
performing right societies and music publishers opposed granting
sound recording copyright owners a public performance right. The
claim of the performing rights societies and the music publishers
was that if such a right were recognized, they stood to lose substantial revenue. They argued that the total revenues that radio
stations and others that engage in public performances would be
willing to pay would remain the same, leaving the performing
rights societies "to battle the recording industry over the slice of
the pie that each obtains. 6 2 The broadcasters' arguments in opposition to the general public performance right for sound recordings
confirmed that this was a likely scenario.
E. Adding Complexity - The DigitalPerformanceRightfor Sound
Recordings
In 1995 the potential for digital delivery of recorded music
caused Congress to add complexity to what was already one of the
most complex areas of copyright law. Responding to arguments
by record labels that revenues from record sales were going to be
significantly damaged by new methods for digital delivery of mu60 Performance Royalty: Hearings on S. 1111 Before the Subcomm. on Patents, Tradeth
marks, and Copyright of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 94 Cong., 1-4 (1975).
61 Id. at 5 (noting that "Congress ...has heard some voices in opposition"); see also Allen
Edward Molnar, Comment, Performance Royalties and Copyright: A Question of "Sound"
Policy, 8 SETON HALL L. REV. 678, 688-93 (1978) (discussing decisional law prior to 1976
regarding sound recording performance rights); William H. O'Dowd, Note, The Need for a
Public PerformanceRight in Sound Recordings, 31 HARV. J. LEGIS. 249, 253-54 (1994) (noting
that lobbying efforts against such a provision "threatened passage of the entire Copyright Act"
and so it was ultimately passed "without the clause creating a public performance right in sound
recordings.").
62 Paul Goldstein, Commentary on "An Economic Analysis of Copyright Collectives," 78
VA. L. REV. 413, 414 (1992).
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sic, Congress enacted the Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act of 1995 (DPRSRA).6 3 This Act added the right "to
perform the copyrighted work publicly by means of a digital audio
transmission"& to those rights enjoyed by sound recording copyright owners.
While the DPRSRA appeared to be adding a public performance right for sound recording copyright owners, the limitations
placed on that right were aimed at granting copyright owners in
sound recordings a mechanism for controlling digital exploitations
that were perceived to pose a serious threat to the sales of CDs. At
the time, the concern was for new business models offering "audio-on-demand" and "pay-per-listen" services that allowed a level
of interactivity between a subscriber and the service, permitting
the subscriber to "order-up" certain songs or albums that would
then be broadcast for that subscriber's listening pleasure. 65 The
record companies feared that if consumers could obtain their music
through such services they would be less likely to purchase CDs.
Far from a general public performance right, 66 this more limited
public performance right for sound recordings is encumbered with
a set of complicated definitions and exceptions.
Because, at present, sound recording copyrights are not given
a general public performance right, playing a sound recording in
an auditorium filled with people is not actionable by the sound recording copyright owner. 67 What constitutes a "digital audio
transmission" defines this right that is granted in section 106(6).
The Copyright Act defines "to 'transmit' a performance" as: "to
communicate it by any device or process whereby images or
68
sounds are received beyond the place from which they are sent.,
A digital transmission is defined as "a transmission in whole or in
63 Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-39, 109
Stat. 336 (1995). Congress added this new right "toensure that performing artists, record companies and others whose livelihood depends upon effective copyright protection for sound recordings, will be protected as new technologies affect the ways in which their creative works are
used." S. REP. No. 104-128, at 10 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 356, 357 [hereinafter
DPRSRA Senate Report].
64 Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-39, § 2,
109 Stat. 336 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. section 106(6) (2000)).
65 See DPRSRA Senate Report, supra note 63, at 14.
66 The Copyright Office, the Patent and Trademark Office, and the Clinton Administration
all recommended that sound recording copyright owners be granted a full public performance
right. See id. at 13 (citing such authorities as advocates for greater public performance rights);

BRUCE A. LEHMAN, INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE TASK FORCE, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
AND THE NATIONAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE 225 (1995) (commonly referred to as the

"White Paper").
67 Such a performance would, however, be actionable by the copyright owner of the musical work that may be embodied in the sound recording.
68 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000).
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part in a digital or other non-analog format., 69 Therefore, if a
sound recording is sent via digital or other non-analog technology
to a place that is beyond where the sender is located and such
sending constitutes a public performance, the copyright owner's
right under section 106(6) is implicated.
The devil, however, is in the details. Congress was attempting to address the fears of the sound recording industry that digital
delivery would eviscerate the market for CDs and other tangible
objects through which sound recording copyright owners make
their money. At the same time, Congress did not want to "upset[]
the longstanding business and contractual relationships among record producers and performers, music composers and publishers
and broadcasters. 7 ° In other words, Congress did not want to rock
the boat. Achieving this goal, however, required an exceedingly
complex set of provisions, which Congress revised and made more
complicated a mere three years later. The next two Sections of this
Article provide a necessarily brief overview of this morass of
statutory language, currently codified in sections 114 and 115.
F

A World Full of Overlap - DigitalPhonorecordDeliveries

The addition of a public performance right for sound recordings came in response to digital delivery of music. While
sound recording copyright owners feared that digital delivery
would usurp the market for CD sales and significantly lessen their
revenues, the reduction in CD sales would also decrease the revenues for musical work copyright owners. Recall that for each
"mechanical" copy of a musical work distributed, the musical
work copyright owner receives a royalty payment, currently eight
cents per copy distributed. 71 The DPRSRA amended the statute to
make clear that digital downloads constitute a mechanical copy
encompassed by the compulsory license.
The Act uses the term "digital phonorecord delivery" (DPD),
defined as "each individual delivery of a phonorecord by a digital
transmission of a sound recording which results in a specifically
identifiable reproduction. 72 The definition specifically excludes
real-time transmissions "where no reproduction of the sound recording or the musical work embodied therein is made from the
inception of the transmission through to its receipt by the retrans-

69

70
71
72

Id.
DPRSRA Senate Report, supra note 63, at 13.
See supra notes 32-37 and accompanying text.
17 U.S.C. § 115(d) (2000).
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mission recipient in order to make the sound recording audible. '7 3
Because of this exclusion, a streamed transmission 74 presumably is
not considered a DPD.75 If, however, a web site allows individuals
to download copies of an MP3 file, for example, the downloaded
file is a "phonorecord" that qualifies as a "specifically identifiable
reproduction," and the entity running the web site has therefore
engaged in a DPD.
The Copyright Act, as amended by the DPRSRA, makes clear
that the compulsory license for "mechanical" copies is available
for these DPDs to authorize the reproduction of the musical work.
That compulsory license does not, however, authorize the reproduction of the sound recording that is also embodied in the digital
file.76 Further, the legislative history indicates that it is entirely
possible for a sound recording copyright owner to authorize DPDs
of the sound recording but not authorize mechanical reproductions
of the musical work rendered in the sound recording." Such action would be permissible even if the sound recording were initially recorded and distributed pursuant to a mechanical license. In
such a situation, the legislative history provides that the entity engaging in the digital distribution would then need to obtain, in ad73 Id.

74 Streaming technology uses a different protocol from the packet switching of the TCP
Internet. Streaming uses the user database protocol (UDP) that is more forgiving of errors in
packets of data as they are received to allow for uninterrupted play. Once a few seconds worth
of data have been received, decompressed, and decoded, a computer's media player will begin
playing the recording. While playing, the computer is receiving more data, decompressing, and
decoding that data, and placing the data in the buffer. The buffer is a small portion of Random
Access Memory (RAM) that holds a few seconds of sound at any one time. RON WHITE, How
COMPUTERS WORK 355-57 (Angela Wethington ed., 1999).
75 The Senate Report on the DPRSRA contains the following example:
[A] transmission by a noninteractive subscription transmission service
that transmits in real time a continuous program of music selections chosen by the transmitting entity, for which a consumer pays a flat monthly
fee, would not be a "digital phonorecord delivery" so long as there was
no reproduction at any point in the transmission in order to make the
sound recording audible. Moreover, such a transmission would not be a
"digital phonorecord delivery" even if subscribers, through actions taken
on their own part, may record all or part of the programming from that
service.
DPRSRA Senate Report, supra note 63, at 45. In exploring this exception, Nimmer
points out that the negative pregnant in the exclusion of a "real-time, non-interactive subscription transmission" leaves open the question whether either an interactive or non-subscription
transmission in real time results in a DPD. He concludes that construing the Act to encompass
such transmissions within the definition of DPDs would contradict with the statutory definition
that requires the delivery result in a "specifically identifiable reproduction." 2 MELVILLE B.
NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 8.23[A][2], at 8-354-55 (2000) (using

quotes from 17 U.S.C. § 115(d) and the above mentioned Senate Report to make his argument).
76 In fact, authorization by the sound recording copyright owner is a condition of the
mechanical license for the DPD. 17 U.S.C. § 11 5(c)(3)(H)(i)(I).
77 DPRSRA Senate Report, supra note 63, at 43-44.
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dition to the authorization from the sound recording copyright
owner, its own mechanical license from the musical work copy78
right owner.
Further complicating the matter, the statute expressly provides, (in three places!) that a DPD may also constitute a public
performance. 79 The significance of this possibility requires emphasis. Engaging in an authorized DPD requires payment of royalties to the sound recording copyright owner for the reproduction
that occurs, and, as explored in the previous paragraph, payment of
royalties under a mechanical license to the musical work copyright
owner. 80 Payment of those two royalties only authorizes the reproduction and distribution of copies of that recorded music, it
does not permit the licensee to engage in a public performance of
the musical work if a DPD constitutes a public performance.
Permission to publicly perform the musical work must also then be
obtained (most likely from one of the CROs). And, because the
performance is occurring by means of a digital transmission, permission to publicly perform the sound recording will also be necessary.
The provisions concerning the royalty rates make the picture
even hazier. The statute directs that the rates for the DPD compulsory license shall distinguish between a DPD in general and a DPD
"where the reproduction or distribution of a phonorecord is incidental to the transmission which constitutes the digital phonorecord delivery." 8' Such incidental DPDs are not exempt from royalty payments, the rates merely need to "distinguish" those DPDs.
Thus, an activity that looks predominately like a public performance and not a DPD, nonetheless may require authorization from,
and payment to, the musical work copyright owner for the reproductions that may incidentally be made, and presumably to the
sound recording 82copyright owner who will need to be consulted
and paid as well!
78

Id.

79 17 U.S.C. §§ 115(d), 115(c)(3)(A), and 115(c)(3)(K)(i).

80 After an agreement reached between the RIAA and the National Music Publishers
Association, it is possible that mechanical licenses for DPDs could be issued in bulk format.
Songwriters, Music Publishers Reach Landmark Deal for Internet Music Licensing, 62 PAT.

TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) 539, 539 (2001). The agreement itself is available at
http://nmpa.org/pr/FinalRIAAAgreement.pdf (last visited Jan 31, 2003) (on file with the Case
Western Reserve Law Review).
S 17 U.S.C. § 115(c)(3)(C).
82 Again, the Senate Report provides an illustration:
[I]f
a transmission system was designed to allow transmission recipients
to hear sound recordings substantially at the time of transmission, but the
sound recording was transmitted in high-speed burst of data and stored
in a computer memory for prompt playback (such storage being techni-
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The Granddaddyof Complexity - DigitalPerformances

As explained above, in 1995 Congress granted sound recording copyright owners a limited public performance right. The
contours of that right, however, were spelled out through a three
tier system: (1) some performances of sound recordings by means
of digital audio transmissions were statutorily exempt; (2) some
were granted a compulsory license in the statute; and (3) some
were left within the complete control of the copyright owner to be
voluntarily licensed within the confines of statutory limits on such
licenses.8 3
Broadly speaking the 1995 amendments divided digital transmissions based on whether they were subscription or nonsubscription and whether the nonsubscription broadcasts were interactive.
Interactive services 84 were within voluntary licensing (category
(3), above), meaning that authorization from the sound recording
copyright owners were necessary. Non-interactive subscription
services were within the copyright owners control, but subject to a
compulsory license, referred to as a "statutory license" (category
(2), above). Non-subscription, non-interactive broadcasts were,

cally the making of a phonorecord), and the transmission recipient could
not retain the phonorecord for playback on subsequent occasions (or for
any other purpose), delivering the phonorecord to the transmission recipient would be incidental to the transmission. If such a system allowed
transmission recipients to retain phonorecords for playback on subsequent occasions, but transmission recipients did not do so, delivering the
phonorecords to the transmission recipients could be incidental to the
transmissions.
DPRSRA Senate Report, supra note 63, at 39.
The problem is similar to an issue raised by the Register of Copyrights in an amicus brief filed
with the Supreme Court in New York Times, Co. v. Tasini. The Register noted that in addition
to reproducing the articles and publicly distributing them, the databases at issue in that case
publicly "displayed" the articles. 533 U.S. 483, 498 n.8 (2001).
83 This creates the "oxymoronic category" of a "mandatory scheme of 'voluntary licensing'..." NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 75, § 8.22[A][1], at 8-299 (2000).
8 The statute defines an "interactive service" as:
one that enables a member of the public to receive a transmission of a
program specially created for the recipient, or on request, a transmission
of a particular sound recording, whether or not as part of a program,
which is selected by or on behalf of the recipient. The ability of individuals to request that particular sound recordings be performed for reception by the public at large, or in the case of a subscription service, by
all subscribers of the service, does not make a service interactive, if the
programming on each channel of the service does not substantially consist of sound recordings that are performed within 1 hour of the request
or at a time designated by either the transmitting entity or the individual
making such request. If an entity offers both interactive and noninteractive services (either concurrently or at different times), the noninteractive
component shall not be treated as part of an interactive service.
17 U.S.C. § 1140)(7) (2000).
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for the most part, exempt from any control by the sound recording
copyright owner (category (1), above).
Amendments contained in the Digital Millennium Copyright
85 While interactive
Act altered the structure of these provisions.
86
services remained within the voluntary licensing category, the
DMCA amendments expanded the activities that fit in the category
of statutory licensing by significantly reducing the category of activities that were exempt from the sound recording copyright
owner's control. Congress termed this new category of previously
exempt but now subject to statutory licensing "eligible nonsubscription transmission[s]," defining the term to mean:
a noninteractive nonsubscription digital audio transmission..
. that is made as part of a service that provides audio programming consisting, in whole or in part, of performances of
sound recordings, including retransmissions of broadcast
transmissions, if the primary purpose of the service is to provide to the public such audio or other entertainment programming, and the primary purpose of the service is not to
sell, advertise, or promote particular products or services
other than sound recordings, live concerts, or other musicrelated events.87
Generally speaking, this definition encompasses your average
webcasting radio station. 88 Therefore, if a radio station is transmitting its broadcasts via the Internet, the radio station will need authorization to publicly perform any sound recordings it includes in
its broadcasts. That authorization can be obtained directly from
the copyright owner (for each sound recording), or the radio station may avail itself of the statutory license if it stays within the
statutory requirements for such a license.
Multiple separate conditions must be met for an eligible entity
to stay within the bounds of the statutory license. These provisions are quite detailed and quite complex. One requirement prohibits the service from exceeding the "sound recording performFor a good account of some of the politics that resulted in both the DPRSRA and the
amendments made by the DMCA, see Craft, supra note 16, at 9-19.
86 For an exploration of what it means 'for a service to be "interactive," see Steven M.
Marks, Entering the Sound Recording PerformanceRight Labyrinth: Defining Interactive Services and the Broadcast Exemption, 20 Loy. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 309 (2000).
85

87

17 U.S.C. § 1140)(6) (2000).

88 "Webcasting implies real-time transmission of encoded video under the control of the
server to multiple recipients who all receive the same content at the same time. This is in contrast to normal web browsing which is controlled from the browser by individual users and may
take arbitrarily long to deliver a complete document." available at http://www.dictionary.con

search?q=webcasting (Sept. 6, 1997) (on file with Case Western reserve Law Review).
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ance complement."" Supposedly designed to permit typical programming practices used on traditional broadcast radio, 90 the
sound recording performance complement prohibits digital transmitters from performing, in any three hour period, more than four
selections from a single album or single featured recording artist. 91
The maximum number is reduced to three selections if two or more
of the selections are played consecutively. 92 Another of the requirements prohibits the transmitter from publishing program
schedules or lists of featured artists or selections that will be included in an upcoming transmission. 93 While the statute permits
services to identify the names of the featured artists and specific
sound recordings immediately before they are played, a service
must be careful in identifying even illustrative examples of the artists played. Continuous programs 94 that are longer than three
hours are permitted, while ones of shorter duration are outside the
scope of the statutory license, and thus require permission directly
from the sound recording copyright owner.95 Similarly, archived
programs 96 that are longer than five hours are within the statutory
license, so long as they do not remain available on the webcaster's
site for more than two weeks. 97 There are many more details but,
hopefully, the reader now has some idea of the complexity contained in the statute.
The statute's exceptional detail, subsequent rulemakings before the Copyright Office,98 litigation appealing the rules, 99 rate
making arbitrations, °° and subsequent legislation to provide relief
89 17 U.S.C. § I14(d)(2)(B)(i).
90 DPRSRA Senate Report, supra note 63, at 26.
91 17 U.S.C. § 114(j)(13)(B).
92 Id. § 114(j)(13)(A).
93 Id. § l14(d)(2)(C)(ii).
94 "A 'continuous program' is a predetermined program that is continuously performed in
the same order and that is accessed at a point in the program that is beyond the control of the
transmission recipient." Id. § 1140)(4).
95 Id. § 114(d)(2)(C)(iii)(ll1).
96 "An 'archived program' is a predetermined program that is available repeatedly on the
demand of the transmission recipient and that is performed in the same order from the beginning, except that an archived program shall not include a recorded event or broadcast transmission that makes no more than an incidental use of sound recordings, as long as such recorded
event or broadcast transmission does not contain an entire sound recording or feature a particular sound recording." Id. § 1140)(2).
97 Id. § l 14(d)(2)(C)(iii)(ll).
98 See, e.g., Public Performance of Sound Recordings, 65 Fed. Reg. 77,292, 77,29277,293 (Dec. 11, 2000) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 201).
99 Bonneville Int'l Corp. v. Peters, 153 F. Supp. 2d 763 (E.D. Pa. 2001) (holding that the
copyright office's interpretation of a statutory exemption from copyright coverage was within its
authority).
100 Copyright Office Final Rule Details on New Webcasting Royalties, 67 Fed. Reg.
45,240 (July 8, 2002).
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busy
from the rates,' 0 ' have kept music copyright lawyers quite
02
provisions.1
complicated
these
of
meaning
fleshing out the
The two different types of licenses contemplated for those
3
transmissions that are not exempt10 involve a level of complica-

tion onto themselves. The first category is those licenses that are
"voluntary." These are licenses issued to those services that do not
qualify for the statutory license and are not exempt. The statute
prohibits granting an exclusive license to an interactive service if
the period of exclusivity is greater than twelve months.l°4 Copyright owners can avoid this prohibition by issuing at least five li-

0 5 These restrictions are
censes to different interactive services.

clearly aimed at reducing the effect of market concentration in the
industry. The statute also contains an important restriction on the
licenses issued to non-interactive services that fall within the category of voluntary licenses. Once a sound recording is licensed to
an affiliated entity,' 6 the copyright owner must offer a license "on
no less favorable terms and conditions to all bona fide entities that
offer similar services.' 1 7 This "most-favored nation" requirement
is intended to address "the issue of vertical integration among
companies involved in both the music and the subscription service
business."' 1 8 The statute allows for the appointment of a common
agent to collect fees, presumably on a model of a CRO, but requires that each copyright owner independently establish the rates
1°9
to be charged and other material license terms, to avoid the anti0
trust concerns inherent in any CRO."1
101Small Webcaster Settlement Act of 2002, Pub. L 107-321 (signed Dec. 4, 2002).

See, e.g., Copyright Office Final Rule Details on New Webcasting Royalties, 67 Fed.
Reg. 45,240 (July 2002). An excellent account of the initial battles within the music industry
following enactment of the amendments contained in the DMCA can be found in Craft, supra
note 16, at 19-38.
103 After court affirmance of the Copyright Office interpretation of the exempt categories,
very few transmissions are exempt. See supra notes 98-99. Broadcasters are currently appealing the district court's ruling in the Bonneville case, supra note 99.
IN 17 U.S.C. § 114(d)(3)(A) (2000). Copyright owners that hold fewer than 1,000 sound
recording copyrights may grant exclusive license for up to 24 months. Id. There are also details
in the statute prohibiting the practice of granting sequential exclusive licenses. Id.
105 See 17 U.S.C. § 1l4(d)(3)(B)(i).
partnership
106 An affiliated entity is one "in which the licensor has any direct or indirect
or any ownership interest amounting to 5 percent or more of the outstanding voting or nonvoting stock." Id. § 114(j)(1).
I-0 Id. § 114(h)(1).
108 DPRSRA Senate Report, supra note 63, at 24. Because this most favored nation clause
only applies to non-interactive services, Congress did not address the issues that could arise
through vertical integration of entities offering interactive services, except through the restriction on exclusive licensing.
109 17 U.S.C. § 114(e)(2)(A).
11 See DPRSRA Senate Report, supra note 63, at 28. Although the antitrust concerns are
real, the requirement that the rates be set independently hinders the ability of the common agent
to reduce transaction costs, a fundamental benefit of a CRO.
102
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The second type of license contemplated is the compulsory
"statutory licenses." The statute provides first for negotiated
agreement among the affected parties."' Absent timely agreement,
the Librarian of Congress is to convene a copyright arbitration
royalty panel (CARP) to determine a schedule of rates and terms
binding on all copyright owners and entities seeking to perform
sound recordings pursuant to the statutory license." 2 After an initial six month voluntary negotiation period with no agreement
achieved, the Copyright Office convened a CARP proceeding on
September 27, 1999. 13 The CARP issued its recommendations on
February 20, 2002. The Librarian of Congress rejected the Pjanel's
report and issued its modified ruling on June 20, 2002. 1 That
report set the statutory license using a per-song/per-listener rate of
15
.07 cents.
Parties on both sides of the debate are currently appealing the
rates set by that ruling to the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit." 6 Companies engaging in digital transmissions argue that the
per-song/per-listener method for establishing the royalties will
drive them out of business." 7 Once the rate is finalized by the exhaustion of appeals, the rate will cover all transmissions from October 28, 1998 through December 31, 2002. Of the royalties received pursuant to this license, half is distributed to the copyright
owners of sound recordings and the other half is divided among
the featured artists and non-featured musicians and vocalists. 18
This rate making proceedings has received a tremendous amount
of attention. Its initial effect was to shut down a wide array of
webcasters.19 Subsequently, Congress enacted the Small Webcaster Settlement Act of 2002,120 which is intended to provide
some relief for small commercial and noncommercial webcasters
but requires further negotiation with SoundExchange, the entity

"

See 17 U.S.C. § 114(e)(1).
See id. § 114(f)(3).
113 See 64 Fed. Reg. 52,107 (Sept. 27, 1999).
114 Copyright Office Final Rule Details on New Webcasting Royalties, 67 Fed.
Reg.
45,240 (July 8, 2002).
115 Id.
116 Evan Hansen, Webcasters Sound off on Net Radio Fees, CNET NEWS.COM, Oct.
1,
2002, at http://news.com.com/2100-1023-960336.html (last visited Jan. 31, 2003). The Copyright Office is also considering a motion to stay the final rule. See Copyright Office Request for
Comments on Stay for Webcasting Final Rule, 67 Fed. Reg. 58,550 (Sept. 13, 2002).
17 See Amy Harmon, Royalties Proposal Casts Shadow Over Webcasters, N.Y. TIMES,
April 1, 2002, at Cl (quoting one webcaster describing the rate as "a bankruptcy royalty").
1s See 17 U.S.C. § 114(g).
119 See Hansen, supra note 117 (noting that hundreds of small webcasters shut down in
response to the fees).
120 Pub. L. No. 107-321, 116 Stat. 2780 (2002).
112
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designated to collect royalties on behalf of the sound recording
copyright owners.121
Finally, it is important to emphasize, once the downstream
user has worked its way through the maze required to clear the
public performance right for the sound recording, the downstream
user will still need public performance authorization from the musical work copyright owner. And, as explored above, the downstream user might need to obtain clearance for a DPD (from both
the sound recording copyright owner and the musical work copyright owner), even if it is incidental to the public performance
through transmission!
H. Summary of Rights and Parties
To summarize the rights and parties that play a role in the music industry, there is, first, the creator of the musical work who
typically assigns the copyright initially granted by the Copyright
Act to a music publisher that is usually a member of the National
Music Publishers Association. The musical work copyright is subject to a compulsory license for reproduction and distribution of
mechanical copies, including digital copies that come within the
definition of a digital phonorecord delivery. The compulsory license is seldom used, however, because the Harry Fox Agency is
authorized by many music publishers to negotiate and issue licenses, including licenses for mechanical reproductions and distributions. The general public performance right is typically licensed
through a collective rights organization (CRO), such as ASCAP or
BMI.
Next, there is the sound recording copyright, typically created
by recording artists, musicians, and sound engineers, all of whom
are often under contract with a record label, making the record label the owner of the copyright in the sound recording. Many of
the record labels are members of the RIAA. The sound recording
copyright owner is not granted a general pubic performance right,
and its more limited digital public performance right is also subject
to a separate and complex compulsory license. No CROs exist to
the
license any aspect of the sound recording copyright, although
2
collect fees.' 2
to
agent
common
a
be
to
petitioned
has
RIAA
Anytime a downstream user reproduces copies or distributes
copies of a sound recording, or publicly performs that sound recording, or makes a derivative work of that sound recording, au121

(2002).

Congress Approves Legislation Granting Relief to Small Webcasters, 65 PTCJ 70

122 See supra notes 109-10 and accompanying text.
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thorization from not only the sound recording copyright owner is
needed, but authorization must be obtained from the musical work
copyright owner as well. Unless one of the limitations on the
rights granted to copyright owners applies, multiple clearances will
be needed, particularly if the use involves more than one right.
For example, in webcasting a sound recording, not only will the
webcaster need to have authorization 123 for the public performance
(for both the sound recording copyright and the musical work
copyright), but the webcaster will also need to have authorization
for the reproductions of both copyrighted works that are made in
the process of webcasting.124
The music industry is characterized by dual layers of copyright owners, and each of those copyright owners is granted multiple rights. Some of those rights are subject to compulsory licensing provisions and a few of those rights have spawned entire organizations that specialize in authorizing downstream uses. It is a
complicated maze of rights that must be navigated by a downstream user, and this Article has not even ventured into the complex world of the Audio Home Recording Act 125 or the anticircumvention provisions of the DMCA. 126 Additionally, the issues associated with the exemption for ephemeral copies 127 have
been omitted from this discussion.
II.

REFLECTIONS

Three significant problems are evident in the picture just
painted of copyright law and the music industry. First, as a result
of the dual layer of copyrights and the divided rights granted to
each owner, there are too many vested industry players for downstream users to be able to efficiently obtain the authorizations
needed for downstream use of recorded music. Second, the divisible yet overlapping rights granted to copyright owners leads to industry gridlock and problems with holdout behavior. Finally, the
demands for payment from the downstream user by too many
vested industry players, combined with industry consolidation, result in the price being too high to achieve the goal of copyright. In
123 Authorization may be obtained from the copyright owner or its agent,
or the required
authorization may be found in a statutory license or exemption.
24 As with the public performance right, authorization may be obtained from
the copyright
owner or its agent, or the required authorization may be found in a statutory license or exemption. In the context of the reproductions made in the process of broadcasting, the ephemeral
copy exemption may apply. See 17 U.S.C. § 112 (2000).
M Id. §§ 1001-10.
126
127

Id. § 1201.
Id. § 112.
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the words of economists, the music industry is full of market failures.
High transaction costs are a primary cause of market failure.
The transaction costs are high in the music industry, first, because
a downstream user typically is not interested in using only one
piece of prerecorded music. Radio or webcasting stations broadcast music, nonstop, 24 hours a day. A station cannot survive by
playing only one song over and over again. Alternatively, a business offering digital downloads would not be viable if its selection
of downloads available included only one or a handful of songs.
This type of high transaction costs is similar to the transaction
costs faced by database publishers after the Supreme Court's decision in Tasini. In order for a database to be useful, it needs to include content. The more comprehensive the database, the more
useful it will be. After Tasini, however, database creators cannot
simply obtain authorization from the creators of collective works
such as newspapers and magazines but must gain authorization
from the freelance authors who wrote the individual articles.
While collective rights organizations (CROs) significantly reduce
some of the transaction costs created by this aspect of the music
industry, other problems remain.
In addition to needing to license multiple works, the nature of
the current CROs in the music industry highlights two other factors leading to high transaction costs. CROs only license one layer
of copyright, the musical work. No CRO exists from which to obtain permission to utilize the sound recording copyright. While
Congress attempted to reduce the transaction costs associated with
licensing the sound recording copyright by creating the statutory
license, the complexity of the provisions largely defeats its attempt. And, in the end, payment to at least two entities for each
piece of recorded music used remains necessary.
Additionally, existing CROs only license one of the rights
granted to musical work copyright owners, the public performance
right. This is also true for the statutory license available for some
digital transmissions of sound recordings; it only authorizes the
limited public performance right granted to sound recording copyright owners. The Copyright Act, however, grants separate divisible rights to a copyright owner. As explored above, in the music
industry those separate rights are often controlled by different entities, requiring multiple authorizations for a single activity. For
example, to clear the reproduction right for the musical work one
would typically contact the Harry Fox Agency, but to clear the
public performance rights for that same recording one would likely
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contact ASCAP, BMI, or SESAC. Requiring clearances for each
of the separate rights granted to copyright owners causes transaction costs to multiply.
The legislative history of the DPRSRA indicates Congress
was fully cognizant of the overlapping rights problem.128 'Instead
of finding a way to reduce the resulting high transaction costs,
Congress added more complexity, thereby further increasing the
transaction costs.
If the separate rights clearly covered certain activities and did
not overlap, then the divisible nature of the rights granted to copyright owners would not increase the already high transaction costs.
For example, if permission were needed for a particular use, the
downstream user could obtain permission from the one clear owner
of the particular right implicated. Today, however, we have several different entities claiming an interest in any given activity. ,29
Each of those entities backs its claim with reference to the Copyright Act and the full panoply of legal remedies available. If
clearance from more than one entity is necessary, in addition to
high transaction costs, the environment is ripe for strategic behavior and the potential for holdouts. 130 This is particularly true when
you have muddy rules masquerading as clear entitlements. Even
in light of the mechanisms used to reduce those transaction costs
(e.g., compulsory licensing and CROs), the lack of certainty concerning which right must be authorized creates the very real potential of consumption below the socially optimal level.1 3 1
Because multiple parties argue that their rights are implicated
in a particular activity, those parties each assert that they should be
paid. They each want a slice of the pie. Part of the problem is the
The Senate Report states:
where a digital audio transmission is a digital phonorecord delivery as
well as a public performance of a sound recording, the fact that the public performance may be exempt from liability under section 114(d)(l) or
subject to statutory licensing under section 114(f) does not in any way
limit of impair the sound recording copyright owner's rights and remedies under section 106(3) against the transmitter for the distribution of a
phonorecord of the sound recording. As another example, where an interactive digital audio transmission constitutes a distribution of a phonorecord as well as a public performance of a sound recording, the fact
that the transmitting entity has obtained a license to perform the sound
recording does not in any way limit or affect the entity's obligation to
obtain a license to distribute phonorecords of the sound recording.
DPRSRA Senate Report, supra note 63, at 27.
129 See supra notes 71-82 and accompanying text; see also Mark A. Lemley, Dealing
with
Overlapping Copyrights on the Internet, 22 U. DAYTON L. REV. 547 (1997).
13oSee Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition
From Marx to Markets, I 11 HARV. L. REV. 621, 676-78 (1998).
131 See id.
128
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dual layer of copyright protection. While the transaction costs involved in having to track down more than one owner for each
work in a market that involves using multiple works is cumber32
some at best and debilitating at worst, the sense of having to pay
twice to be able to use a single work strikes many downstream users as counterintuitive, unfair, and excessive. The sense that the
music industry is asking to be paid multiple times for a single use
may contribute to widespread public rejection of the copyright system.
In addition to the market failures created by high transaction
costs and overlapping and unclear rights, the obstacle of price also
stands in the way for authorized downstream use of recorded music. The price being charged by each of the separate entities when
combined for a final total price paid by the user is not conducive to
widespread dissemination of these works. These rates are being
set either by the copyright owners or their various agents, or by the
Copyright Office under compulsory or statutory licensing. Not all
of the arbitration procedures used to set the compulsory licensing
royalty rates are designed to take into account the reality of the
industry and the nature of a particular downstream use in light of
the ultimate goal of copyright. 33 When not set through compulsory or statutory licensing, the consolidation of the music industry
into a handful of large record labels, and the other vested industry
players acting as agents for large numbers of copyright owners,
creates opportunities for monopolistic pricing.
In the list of items that can create market failures, the music
industry boasts many: high transaction costs caused by multiple
parties, some of which are hostile to each other; numerous contingencies created by complex legal regulation; high costs of monitoring; and costly punishments. Additionally, the uncertain and
complex rights increase the transaction costs. When the transaction costs are sufficiently high, reaching market bargains is less
likely. Alternatives to individual bargaining can be employed and
have been tried with some success for the music industry in the
132 See Harmon, supra note 1, at Cl (describing the "nightmare" faced by companies trying to obtain clearances).
133 The general rules governing CARPs provide that the determinations are to be calculated
to (1) maximize the availability of creative works to the public; (2) provide a fair return to copyright owners for his creative work; (3) reflect the relative roles of the copyright owner and the
copyright user; and (4) minimize any disruptive impact on the structure of the industries involved. 17 U.S.C. § 801(b)(l). In contrast, the statutory licensing for digital public performances of sound recordings directs the arbitration panels to set royalty rates using a "willing
buyer and willing seller" standard. 17 U.S.C. § 114(f)(2)(B). The Internet Radio Fairness Act,
H.R. 5285 would replace that standard and direct that the standard set forth in section 801 be
used. H.R. 5285, 107th Cong. (2002)
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pre-digital era. 134 Legal reform should also seek to remove the
impediments to private agreements.13 Part III of this Article proposes several such reforms.
The reforms proposed in this Article are attempts to provide
workable solutions that are technology neutral. A recent trend in
copyright legislation has been to amend the statute to address
problems associated with a specific technology. 36 Copyright
scholars have also suggested revisions that would address the current crises created by peer-to-peer file sharing over the Internet. 3 7
While these solutions may provide temporary fixes for current
problems, and indeed they may be necessary once a problem has
developed, these technology specific solutions fail to provide the
kind of structural reform that will assist in preventing future problems in the face of inevitable technological change. The proposals
outlined in Part III of this Article offer suggestions for such structural reforms.

III. UNTANGLING THE WEB
The current legal landscape for music copyrights clearly has
resulted from a process of accretion. As technology changed, new
rights were added, new copyright interests created, and even more
rights added. However, if one were to devise a system for the efficient allocation of rights, one would not pick the current allocation. As has been noted by law and economics scholars, "[p]olitics
leads to bargains and compromises that violate the requirements of
economic efficiency."'' 38 The current state of copyright in the music industry has led to a situation in which the industry cannot embrace new business models in large part because of the inability to
satisfy the different constituencies of the vested industry players. 139 At the same time, millions of users have rejected the notion
that there is anything wrong with copying creative works without
paying for them. These users have turned to file sharing systems
134 Compulsory licenses reduce transaction costs by setting the terms of the agreement
and
by providing administrative support in the form of record keeping, royalty collection and distribution. CROs also reduce transaction costs, but do so in a different way. Merges, supra note
41, at 1295-96.
35 This normative version of the Coase theorem is explored in ROBERT COOTER & THO-

MAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 93-94 (3d ed. 2000).

316 See, e.g., Audio Home Recording Act, Pub. L.
No. 102-563, 106 Stat. 4237 (codified as
amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1010 (2000)) (addressing Digital Audio Tape technology).
131See, e.g., Neil Weinsock Netanel, Impose a Noncommercial Use
Levy to Allow P2P
File-Swappingand Remixing, at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=352560.
j38 Id. at 124.
139 Satisfying the different constituencies involves more than just a slice of the royalty pie,
the different industry players also evidence different levels of risk aversion concerning new
technologies, for example controlling copies in the digital realm.
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and are, in some ways, understandably enraged when the music
industry seeks to use copyright law to shut off the supply of "free"
music.
Designing a new system for copyright in the digital age will
upset the current balance of power in the music industry. That,
however, should not stop us from fixing a system that is truly broken. This Part of this Article proposes different areas of copyright
law that are ripe for reform. First, to facilitate downstream use of
creative works, copyright law should embrace the doctrine of derivative work independence. Next, the six separate rights granted
to copyright owners should be consolidated into one "right to
commercially exploit" the copyrighted expression. Each of these
proposals involves controversial changes to the current system and
will raise many objections, particularly among vested industry
players. This Part discusses some of the legitimate complaints that
may be raised about these proposals because of the negative effects of the proposed changes. However, with each proposed
change, the potential negative effects are outweighed by the enhanced likelihood of promoting copyright's ultimate goal as technologies for experiencing copyright works continue to evolve.
A.

Identify the Goals

Before undertaking any major revision of the Copyright Act,
it is important to identify the goal that such a law should be designed to serve. The ultimate goal of a new, revised, copyright law
should be the same as the ultimate goal of the 1976 Act - to promote progress in knowledge and learning. 40 It is widely accepted
that in the United States, the Copyright Act seeks to achieve such
progress through the grant of a marketable right that will provide
appropriate incentives for the creation and dissemination of creative works. But, in the face of digital reality, copyright needs to
shift some of its focus from providing incentives for creation and
distribution, to facilitating widespread dissemination. So long as
copyright law maintains sufficient means for compensating the
authors of the creative works, copyright law would better serve the
goal of promoting progress by reducing obstacles to the dissemination of creative works.
At a time when digitized works can be replicated quickly and
easily by users without requiring the manufacturing plants and dis140 It is always worth remembering the underlying goals of copyright. Believing that the
purpose is "fairness" to creators, or compensation for investment in creation or dissemination of
creative works may result in choosing legal rules that may promote a different goal and actually
deter the promotion of the true goal of copyright.
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tribution mechanisms of the past, obstacles which prevent rapid
dissemination from occurring should be eliminated. Fundamentally, the existence of copyright protection itself creates a significant obstacle in the form of a legal prohibition on many dissemination activities. Eliminating copyright protection, however, would
reduce incentives for the creation to such a degree that it would, in
the end, be detrimental to achieving copyright's goals.141 It is important to design the copyright system to retain the necessary incentive for creation while at the same time facilitating the widest
possible distribution and downstream use.
B.

Embrace Derivative Work Independence

Assuming that one agrees that copyright protection is necessary at all,142 one way to facilitate dissemination is to design the
copyright system to reduce rather than increase any transaction
costs that a downstream user of an existing work may encounter
when seeking to obtain permission for such dissemination.
If a downstream user must obtain multiple authorizations in
order to disseminate a single work, this increases the transaction
costs. Thus, the first obvious place for increasing the likelihood of
greater dissemination is by reducing the number of copyright owners from whom a downstream user must negotiate permission. In
the music industry, for example, at a minimum most downstream
users need to obtain permission for both the musical work and
sound recording. The existence of these dual layers of copyright
protection should not be eliminated, however, as each provides
compensation to creative talents brought to bear on the end product. Additionally, two layers are necessary because there will remain instances where a downstream user seeks to make use of only
musical works and not sound recordings. Thus, what is needed is a
system in which the downstream user can obtain one permission
without worrying that additional permissions from additional
rights' holders are needed. The best way to achieve this singlesource authorization is to embrace the doctrine of derivative work
independence.
In the field of music copyrights, embracing derivative work
independence would mean that full authorization to use a particular sound recording (including its underlying musical work) could
be obtained from the sound recording copyright owner. To ac141But see Ku, supra note 11, at 305-11 (arguing that if copyright were eliminated other
mechanisms for compensating authors would provide sufficient incentives for creation).
142 This is a proposition scholars have questioned. See supra note 11. This Article assumes that some level of copyright protection is necessary to provide incentives for creation.
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complish derivative work independence and reap all of the benefits
the doctrine has to offer, it will be necessary to repeal the compulsory license for mechanical reproductions of musical works. Finally, for derivative work independence to function efficiently in
the music industry, sound recordings need to be treated similarly
to musical works with regard to the rights granted to copyright
owners. It is important that these three changes be implemented
together. Implementing only one or two of these changes could
further complicate matters without providing any additional benefit towards the ultimate goal of copyright.
1.

Derivative Work Independence

Currently, a sound recording embodies both the work that is
protected by the sound recording copyright and the work that is
protected by the musical work copyright.143 In copyright terms,
the sound recording is a derivative work based on the musical
work. 144 A derivative work is a work that is "based upon one or
more preexisting works., 145 The146statute lists sound recordings as
an example of derivative works.
Currently, without derivative work independence, courts have
recognized that reproducing or publicly performing a derivative
work also constitutes a reproduction or performance of the work,
or works, on which the derivative work is based. In music, if a
webcasting radio station wishes to utilize sound recordings of musical works, the station must obtain permission from both the
sound recording copyright owners and the musical work copyright
owners. If the current law embraced the doctrine of derivative
work independence, obtaining permission to use the derivative
work is all that would be required. Under this doctrine, the copyright owner in an underlying work on which the authorized derivative work is based cannot claim infringement involving activities
that utilize the underlying work only as part of the derivative work.

143 As noted previously, not all copyrighted sound recordings embody protected musical
works, or even musical works at all. For example, books on tape and recordings of nature
sounds are sound recordings eligible for copyright protection that do not include musical works.
This Article focuses on sound recordings that embody musical works because of the dual layers
of copyrights existing in the resulting sound recording.
144 If the sound recording is mechanically reproducing the musical work pursuant to the
compulsory license of section 115, the statute allows for a new arrangement to be made of that
musical work, but that new arrangement is prohibited from obtaining copyright protection. 17
U.S.C. § 115(a)(2) (2000). This prohibition on derivative work copyright is for a new musical
work copyright. It is not a prohibition on obtaining copyright in the sound recording itself.
145 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000).
146 Id.
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Derivative work independence provides that the creation of
the derivative work results in a new and independent property right
- the copyright in the derivative work. That new property right is
independent from any pre-existing works that were incorporated
into the derivative work. In order to be able to reproduce and distribute copies of the derivative work or perform the derivative
work, the creator of the derivative work would only require permission to use the underlying work to create the derivative work;
the derivative work creator would not also need to obtain the right
to reproduce, distribute, and display that underlying work as incorporated in the derivative work. More importantly, in the context of facilitating the digital dissemination of works, the downstream user of a derivative work would not be required to obtain
permission from the various copyright owners in the underlying
works that may be incorporated in the derivative work. Obtaining
permission from the47 derivative work copyright owner is all that
would be required.
Derivative work independence does not result in the loss of
copyright protection for the underlying works merely because of
the creation of an authorized derivative work. If a downstream
user makes use of an underlying work not as part of an authorized
derivative work, the copyright owner of the underlying work may
still bring suit. This remains true even if the copyright owner has
authorized other derivative works to be created. For example,
once a musical work is embodied in an authorized sound recording, a new recording artist could not create her own recording
of that musical work without first securing authorization from the
musical work copyright owner.
If derivative work independence were the rule, copyright
owners in the underlying musical work would understand that in
authorizing the creation of a derivative sound recording, they are
allowing a new property right to come into existence. That new
property right may be exploited in ways unknown at the time of
contracting for the creation of the derivative work. Thus the copyright owner in the underlying work should contract for benefits as
he sees fit, including the possibility of royalty payments generated
from the exploitation of the derivative work sound recording. If
this new property right were allowed to come into existence, the
transaction costs that result from payments to copyright owners of
147 See F. Jay Dougherty, Not a Spike Lee Joint? Issues in the Authorship of Motion Pictures under U.S. Copyright Law, 49 UCLA L. REV. 225, 249-51 (2001) (recognizing that "derivative work independence is consistent with copyright's purpose because it facilitates public
access to a derivative work").
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the underlying works would be shifted to the parties engaged in the
creation of a derivative work. The creators of the sound recording
and the copyright owners in the underlying work are better able to
negotiate meaningful
methods of reducing any remaining transac48
CoStS.
tion
The Second Circuit briefly embraced the doctrine of derivative work independence 49 only to have the doctrine subsequently
rejected by the Supreme Court in Stewart v. Abend.1 50 In that case,
the Supreme Court was confronted with a derivative work, the
movie Rear Window, that was made pursuant to a contract with the
author of a short story on which the movie was based. The author,
however, died before the beginning of the renewal term of copyright. The subsequent assignee of the renewal term copyright in
the short story sought to stop the creators of the movie from
engaging in further distribution of the movie during the renewal
term of copyright protection for the short story. In that context,
the Court rejected the idea of an independent derivative work. The
Court held that the distributors of the movie were violating the
copyright in the short story because the authorization that they had
obtained lasted only during the first term of copyright.
The importance of the renewal term and the statutory vesting
rules for that renewal term drove the Court to reject derivative
work independence. The Court believed that if an independent
new property right were permitted in this derivative work and if
that new property right meant that the derivative work owner could
reproduce and distribute the derivative work past the first term of
copyright, even if, pursuant to the statute, the renewal term had
vested in someone that had not authorized the creation of the derivative work, it would circumvent the statutory vesting rules.
While that reasoning may have made some sense under the 1909
Act's dual term of copyright
protection, today's copyright statute
5
grants a unified term.' '
In place of the renewal vesting rules, the 1976 Act grants to
the author of a copyrighted work the right to terminate any transfer
of copyright ownership thirty-five years after the date of the grant.
148 To the extent that these parties are not of equal bargaining power, there are other
mechanisms that can be used to facilitate bargaining. See Maureen O'Rourke, Bargaining in the
Shadow of Copyright Law after Tasini, 53 CASE W. RES L. REV. 603 (2003).
149 See Rohauer v. Killiam Shows, Inc., 551 F. 2d 484 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 431
U.S. 949 (1977).
150 495 U.S. 207 (1990).
151 Although renewal terms will continue to haunt us until the year 2072 (1977 + 95 =
2072), the renewal term will begin for the last works covered by the dual term system in 2005

(1977 + 28 = 2005).

CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 53:673

This termination right is not transferable, nor is it waivable, t52 and,
if the author dies before the exercise of the termination right, the
termination right vests according to statutory vesting rules.' 53 Initially, it would seem that the termination rights present the same
policy arguments in favor of rejecting the doctrine of derivative
work independence. There is, however, an important distinction:
the termination provisions expressly provide that derivative works
created pursuant to the grant before the effective date of any termination may continue to be utilized under the terms of the
grant. 154 Congress recognized the problem that would be created if
underlying work owners could stop the exploitation of an authorized derivative work already created. This is a form of derivative
work independence - once the derivative work is created, the author in the underlying work is not given any right pursuant to the
copyright statute to stop the exploitation of that derivative work by
the derivative work copyright owner. 155
In Stewart the Supreme Court also looked to the language of
the 1976 Act to determine the scope of the rights granted to the
creator of a derivative work. Specifically, section 103 of the Act
provides:
The copyright in a compilation or derivative work extends
only to the material contributed by the author of such work,
as distinguished from the preexisting material employed in
the work, and does not imply any exclusive right in the preexisting material. The copyright in such work is independent
of, and does not affect or enlarge the scope, duration, ownership, or subsistence
of, any copyright protection in the pre56
existing material. 1
The Court wrongly viewed this language as requiring rejection of
the doctrine of derivative work independence.
This language, however, delineates the rights of the derivative
work copyright owners consistent with a theory of derivative work
independence.' 57 In the music context, for example, the first sen152 17 U.S.C. § 203(a)(5) (2000).
15- The termination right vests in the widow or widower of the author, children or lineal
descendants (on a per stirpes basis), etc.. 17 U.S.C. § 203(a)(2).
154 17 U.S.C. § 203(b)(1).
155 The existence of the provision protecting the exploitation of the derivative work could
provide evidence that the '76 Act does not embody the doctrine derivative work independence.
Stewart, 495 U.S. at 234. Alternatively, the provision's existence could signal a change from
the prior rules of the 1909 Act and assurance that Congress intended derivative work independence under the new statute.
156 17 U.S.C. § 103(b).
157 Stewart, 495 U.S. at 239 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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tence provides that a sound recording copyright owner is given
protection for those elements of the work that are new to the sound
recording. The sound recording copyright owner could not stop
someone from recording their own version of the musical work or
reproducing copies of the musical work in sheet music. The second sentence further clarifies that the copyright in derivative work
is independent of the copyright in the musical work. If, for example, the copyright owner of the sound recording were to expressly
abandon his copyright, that would not constitute an abandonment
of the copyright in the musical work, except to the extent embodied in the derivative work. Reproducing the sound recording in
reliance on that abandonment would not be actionable by the musical work copyright owner, 58 but reproducing sheet music of the
musical work in reliance on that abandonment would be actionable.
Before the Supreme Court's decision in Stewart v. Abend,
scholars had persuasively argued in favor of derivative work independence. 59 After the decision, unfortunately, few have tried to
revive the doctrine.16° To allow copyright law to harness the full
potential of digital dissemination, and thereby further its primary
goal, requires that we reconsider the positive effects of embracing
derivative work independence - namely, sharp reductions in transaction costs for downstream users and the concomitant increase in
the extent of dissemination.
2.

Eliminate the Compulsory License of Section 115

As described above, embracing the doctrine of derivative
work independence requires allowing the copyright owners of
works that might be included in derivative works the freedom to
structure licenses in a variety of ways. Almost all copyright own-

158 This example illustrates why the contractual arrangements between the copyright owner
in the musical work and the creator of the sound recording would be critical. If the copyright
owner desired to avoid the economic ramifications that abandonment of the copyright in the
sound recording might have, the contract would need to prohibit such abandonment. An abandonment in the face of contractual prohibition would give rise to an action for breach by the
musical work copyright owner against the sound recording creator, but not for infringement
against users of the, now abandoned, sound recording.
159 See, e.g., Richard Colby, Rohauer Revisited: "Rear Window," Copyright Reversions,
Renewals, Terminations, Derivative Works and Fair Use, 13 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 569, 580-81
(1986); Carol A. Ellingson, The Copyright Exception for Derivative Works and the Scope of
Utilization, 56 IND. L.J. 1 (1980); Peter Jaszi, When Works Collide: Derivative Motion Pictures,
Underlying Rights, and the Public Interest,28 UCLA L. REV. 715 (1981).
160See, e.g., Dougherty, supra note 147, at 249-5 1.
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ers have relatively complete freedom of contract. 16 The major
exceptions to this contracting freedom come in the form of compulsory licensing. 162 In the context of the creation of derivative
sound recordings, the availability of the compulsory mechanical
license codified in section 115 constrains the bargains that musical
work copyright owners might otherwise be able to obtain. As described above,' 63 a musical work copyright owner's right to reproduce the work in copies is subject to a compulsory license for mechanical copies once the work has been distributed in mechanical
copy form. To allow for the consolidation of rights in a single
party through the doctrine of derivative work independence, this
compulsory license should be repealed.
The compulsory license exists because of an historical artifact
- player piano rolls. Once that compulsory license was in place,
however, the present-day music industry grew up around it. The
derivative work independence doctrine would alter the workings of
that industry, and it would be best if freedom of contract prevailed
in structuring the arrangements between musical work copyright
owners and sound recording copyright owners.
It may not be an exaggeration to say that the compulsory license is the root of the problem in the music industry. Because of
the mechanical license and its statutorily provided royalty rate,
there exists a sense of entitlement across the music publishing industry: musical work copyright owners are entitled to eight cents
per "mechanical" copy of their work, regardless of the form that
copy takes, the manner of the distribution, or the price charged for
the distribution. After all, musical work copyright owners are not
permitted to refuse to license these derivative works, so they 64darn
well should be paid for any and all copies that are distributed.'
The compulsory license has also led to a situation of lower
cooperation than might otherwise be expected under a free alienation regime. The mechanical license is something the musical
work copyright owner grants because she knows that she must, not
because she believes this particular recording of her musical work
will bring revenue sufficient to make the bargain worthwhile. The
lower levels of cooperation that result in the industry as a whole
161

The doctrine of copyright misuse provides some limits on abusive contracting practices.

See, e.g., Practice Mgmt. Info. Corp. v. American Med. Assoc., 121 F.3d 516 (9th Cir. 1997); In
re Napster, Inc. Copyright Litigation, 191 F. Supp. 2d 1087, 1109 (N.D. Cal. 2002).
162 The statute also contains some contracting limitations for the category of "voluntary
licensing" for public performances of sound recordings by means of digital audio transmissions.
See supra notes 104-10 and accompanying text.
163 See supra notes 33-34 and accompanying text.
164 See Harmon, supra note I, at C4 (discussing the feeling of entitlement by musical work
copyright owners).
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have been a contributing factor
in the industries' inability to em65
brace new business models. 1
If Congress were to eliminate the compulsory mechanical license, the musical work copyright owners could continue to license their works for incorporation into sound recordings. All
evidence indicates that this is the most likely scenario for three
reasons. First, very few actually use the statutory compulsory license system anyway. 66 Sound recording producers routinely
seek licenses from the Harry Fox Agency, or, less frequently, directly from the copyright owners. Second, Harry Fox has established itself as providing a valuable service, connecting music publishers with potential licensees. There is no reason why, without
the mechanical license, Harry Fox would not continue to perform
that role. The only difference is that the shadow of the compulsory
license would no longer influence the terms of the agreements
reached. Third, for musical work copyright owners, the overwhelming majority of their revenue is generated as a result of
sound recordings, either through sales of copies of the sound recording or through royalties generated from public performances
of the sound recordings.' 67 Thus, the incentive is quite high for
musical work copyright owners to continue to license the creation
of derivative sound recordings. Finally, if without the compulsory
mechanical licenses, existing musical work copyright owners refuse to license their works for the creation of sound recordings, the
law will have generated an additional incentive for the creation of
new musical works rather than the continued recycling of preexisting musical works.
Eliminating the compulsory mechanical license would only
assist in fulfilling copyright's goal if undertaken in combination
with embracing derivative work independence. Without such
combination, elimination of the compulsory license would only
serve to strengthen the bargaining position of one of the existing
vested industry players, without furthering downstream dissemination.
165 See Craft, supra note 16, at 4-9 (describing the conflicts between the musical work
copyright owners and the sound recording copyright owners). The lack of cooperation in the
industry also is evidenced by the heralding of the "historical" and "landmark" agreement
reached between music publishers and the RIAA in 2001. See Songwriters, Music Publishers
Reach Landmark Deal for Internet Music Licensing, supra note 80, at 539.
166 See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
167 Although the proposals advanced in this Article would result in the elimination of direct
payments to musical work copyright owners for public performances engaged in by performance of sound recordings, as outlined in the next sections, the musical work copyright owners
could structure contractual obligations providing for flow-through royalty payments from sound
recording company owners for such public performances.
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3. Grant Sound Recording Copyright Owners Full Public
PerformanceRights
As previously highlighted, sound recording copyright owners
are currently treated as second class copyright owners. The Copyright Act does not grant sound recording copyright owners a general public performance right. Instead, the Act grants only the
right to control public performances by means of digital audio
transmissions, and even that limited performance right has exceptions and compulsory "statutory licensing."' 68 The unequal rights
between musical work copyright owners and sound recording
copyright owners has contributed to the strange bargaining dynamics between the vested industry players.
There are strong arguments in favor of adopting a general
public performance right for sound recordings. First, many countries grant full public performance rights to sound recording copyright owners.'16 Without similar treatment in the United States,
U.S. copyright owners may not benefit from a share of those foreign royalties. 70 More fundamentally, there is no objective reason
should be treated differently from other
why sound recordings
71
works.'
copyrighted
For purposes of this Article, however, the most important reason for extending the general public performance right to sound
recording copyright owners is to create parity with musical work
owners and to allow for flow-through royalties for public performances if the musical work copyright owner and sound recording
copyright owners have contracted for such royalties. Only with
this parity will the doctrine of derivative work independence allow
the parties, including the musical work copyright owner, to profit
from public performances. Only with parity will it become unnecessary to allow a musical work copyright owner the right to sue
when a sound recording that embodies that musical work is publicly performed without authorization. If sound recording copyright owners were granted a general public performance right then
the sound recording copyright owner would be the appropriate

See supra notes 63-70 and accompanying text.
See O'Dowd, supra note 61, at 261.
170 John R. Kettle 1Il, Dancing to the Beat of a Different Drummer: Global Harmonization
- and the Need for Congress to Get In Step With a Full Public Performance Right for Sound
Recordings, 12 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1041, 1075 (2002).
171 See O'Dowd, supra note 61, at 250 (asserting that the "failure to recognize the substantial contributions of the performers and producers of sound recordings has always been a significant weakness in the copyright law's protective framework").
168
169
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party to bring such a lawsuit. 172 Additionally, a single royalty for
public performances could be collected from downstream users
and then divided among the two sets of copyright owners as is
common practice in European countries. 173
Without embracing derivative work independence, however,
this author recommends strongly against the adoption of a general
public performance right for sound recording copyright owners.
Such a public performance right would merely add yet another
party or right that needs to be "cleared" before downstream users
may use each piece of recorded music.

174

Additionally, the fact

that sound recordings are produced in abundant quantities should
weigh heavily against any argument that such protection is "necessary" for promoting the goal of copyright. In fact, given their
abundant creation, granting a general public performance right for
sound recordings may cause the public to suffer the ill-effects of
monopoly rights when no such rights are necessary to induce creation and dissemination.
The proposal urging the grant of a general public performance
right for sound recordings is made only in the context of embracing derivative work independence and eliminating the mechanical
license. Additionally, this suggestion for a full public performance
right for sound recording copyright owners would be superceded
by the proposal to adopted a unified right of exploitation explored
below in Section III.C.
4.

PotentialNegative Effects

In the music industry today, embracing derivative work independence means allowing sound recording copyright owners to be
the only source of authorization necessary for downstream users of
recorded music. Under the current system both sound recording
copyright owners and musical work owners are necessary points of
authorization. We would be transitioning from a system requiring
permission from two very powerful industries to a system requiring permission from only one. In doing so, however, it is important that incentives for the creation of musical works remain. It is
important that the composers of musical works are sufficiently re-

72 The parties could provide contractually that if the sound recording copyright owner
failed to bring such a suit the musical work copyright owner could be assigned the cause of
action.
173 Craft, supra note 16, at 10.
174 See discussion infra Section 1.C. If the proposed reform in Section m.c is adopted,
granting a full public performance right would be a natural consequence.
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warded so that they will continue to invest in the creation of new
musical works.
If derivative work independence were adopted, any payments
to the composers of musical works would be the result of the contractual bargains struck at the time of authorizing the creation of
sound recordings. The sound recording industry is an extremely
powerful and extremely consolidated industry. The problem of
concentration in the music industry is addressed later in this Paper. 75 Here, however, it is important to consider the relative bargaining power of the record labels and the music publishers, because the former would be the only entity entitled to collect royalties from downstream users if derivative work independence were
adopted.
In general, the composers who write musical works are not
the ones negotiating directly with the record labels. Composers
typically assign their rights to music publishers who then either
negotiate licenses with performing artists and record labels or enter into an agreement with the Harry Fox Agency. Because of the
number of music publishers it represents, the Harry Fox Agency
already has significant bargaining power. Eliminating the compulsory license would provide-musical work copyright owners, either
with far greater barmusic publishers or the Harry Fox Agency,
76
gaining power than they currently possess.
To date, the market power of the Harry Fox Agency has been
kept somewhat in check by the compulsory license. Removing the
compulsory license may cause the Harry Fox Agency to abuse its
market power. However, there are mechanisms other than copyright law to regulate such abuse of power, such as the antitrust
laws and the copyright misuse doctrine.177 Additionally, because
the creation of derivative works does not typically require blanket
licensing of multiple works, but rather can be done on an individual work basis, the potential for certain types of antitrust concerns
to arise is reduced.
Embracing derivative work independence does not, nor should
it, negate the parties' freedom of contract. The ability to freely
contract, however, would allow the parties to recreate the hightransaction-cost structure that we currently have today. For exam175See discussion infra Section HI.D.
176Because of the existence of the established intermediaries of music publishers and the
Harry Fox Agency, authors of musical works would likely fare better than the freelance authors
currently fare in the publishing world. See O'Rourke, supra note 148, at 605-06 (discussing how
the problem of unequal bargaining power in the publishing industry has resulted in freelancers
having to assign away rights in their works for no additional compensation).
177See discussion infra Section HI.C.
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pie, if a copyright owner in a musical work desired to authorize the
creation of a derivative work but did not want to have the sound
recording copyright owner authorize or otherwise control the public performance of the musical work as embodied in the sound recording, the parties could contract to reach this arrangement. The
agreement could provide that while the musical work copyright
owner grants permission for the creation of the derivative sound
recording, the sound recording copyright owner grants back the
right to control the public performance of the sound recording. If
a sound recording copyright owner agrees to such a contract, then
the sound recording copyright owner would not be capable of authorizing certain kinds of downstream uses. This recreates the
situation that we have today where sound recording copyright
owners cannot authorize the public performance of the musical
work embodied in the sound recordings. 78 While this has the potential to recreate the high transaction cost problems present in the
industry today, freedom of contract is critical to copyright ownership. Freedom of contract is also likely to result in a more competitive industry with different musical work copyright owners
offering different terms for the use of their works. Moreover, if
the sound recording copyright owner is given a general public performance right, reaching the kind of deal described in this paragraph will mean the sound recording copyright owner has to give
up a significant revenue potential, and the parties will bargain accordingly.
If the default rule was one of derivative work independence,
and if the sound recording copyright owner is granted full public
performance rights, a downstream user should be permitted to act
in reliance upon a sound recording copyright owner's authorization. In a situation where a downstream user has acted in good
faith, relying on a grant from a copyright owner in the derivative
work, there should be no liability to the copyright owners of underlying works that are embodied in the derivative work. 179 Instead, the underlying work copyright owner would have an action
for breach against the derivative work owner for authorizing uses
beyond the bounds of the contract.
If the dual layers of copyright protection were consolidated by
embracing derivative work independence, downstream users would
need authorization from only one copyright owner - the sound re178 Nothing in the present statute prevents the parties from contracting so that sound recording copyright owners are given the authority to authorize the public performance of the
musical work, although this is rarely, if ever, part of the bargain struck.
179 The current Copyright Act contains such a defense. See 17 U.S.C. § 205(d), (e) (2000).
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cording copyright owner. Recall, however, that downstream users
will want to make use of more than one sound recording and thus
80
will need to contact multiple sound recording copyright owners.,
The resulting transactions costs could be prohibitive. However,
new CROs could be used to effectively reduce those transactions
costs.
C.

Unifying the Rights

Once the dual layers of copyright in recorded music are reoriented with respect to one another through derivative work independence, the next step should be to unify the rights granted to a
copyright owner. Under the current statutory structure, the rights
granted by section 106 are considered separate and distinct, and
are severable from one another. Section 106 grants copyright
owners the right to control the reproduction of works in copies or
phonorecords, the public distribution of copies or phonorecords,
the creation of derivative works, public performances, and public
displays.' 8' The assignment of one right does not waive any of the
other exclusive rights, and assignees of any right are considered
copyright owners under the statute.1 82 This structure is consistent
with conceiving of copyright as a property right; copyright ownership consists of bundle of rights.' 83 But the rights we have today
are overlapping in the face of changing channels of distribution
and exploitation. The sticks in the copyright owner's bundle have
become nets that shift and change shape, tangling to create a web
of rights impeding downstream dissemination.
Some have argued that the way to deal with the changing
methods of exploitation is to grant the copyright owner additional
rights encompassing these new methods of exploitation. 84 Such
additions, without displacing other rights would merely complicate
matters further by potentially creating yet another copyright owner
in a single copyrighted work. Because of the separate and divisible nature of copyright, a system has evolved in which more than
"80 See discussion supra Section I1.
181 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2000). See discussion supra Section I.E. The rights of public distribution and public display are granted only to certain categories of copyrighted works, with sound
recordings receiving a separate right to control the public performance by means of a digital
audio transmission.
182 See 17 U.S.C. § 201(d)(2) (2000) (describing rights under transfer of ownership).
183 See generally Thomas W. Merrill and Henry E. Smith, What Happened to Property in
Law and Economics, 111 Yale L.J. 357 (2001). Merrill and Smith explore the evolution of
conceiving of the in rem nature of property ownership to conceiving of property as a collection
of exclusive rights.
i8 See, e.g., Lemley, supra note 129, at 582 (proposing a "right of transmission" but emphasizing the importance of such a right replacing other rights).
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one party has legal entitlement to stop the downstream utilization
of a work. This significantly raises transaction costs for down85
stream users and can result in hold-out negotiating problems.
Both of those problems contribute to the rampant market failure
that is present in the system today.
Instead of the six separate listed rights, the statute should
simply provide copyright owners with "a right to commercially
exploit the copyrighted expression." In fact, as a result of interpretations given to the terms in the current statute, this is largely what
the statute grants to copyright owners today.' 86 Very few uses of
copyrighted expression do not fall within at least one of the enumerated rights.
To some, an all encompassing "right to commercially exploit"
the copyrighted expression might seem as if copyright owners
would be granted more control than they presently have. In reality, the combination of rights granted by the current Copyright Act
is limited not by the statutory section providing the grant of rights,
section 106, but by a series of limitations codified in other provisions of the Act. For example, the first sale doctrine permits individuals in possession of a lawfully created copy of a copyrighted
work to sell, rent, or otherwise transfer that copy without violating
the copyright owners right to control the public distribution of copies. The first sale doctrine is effected through an express limitation on the distribution right codified in section 109. In all, fifteen
separate sections of the Copyright Act expressly limit the rights
187
granted to copyright owners.
The proposed "right to commercially exploit the copyrighted
expression" would need to be similarly limited. Some of the current formulations of limitations would remain useful. For example, fair use, codified in section 107, is not a limitation specific to
any one right granted by section 106. Other limitations could remain specific to certain types of activities, although in the world of
digital convergence limitations based in right-specific language
can create problems and inequities and should be carefully considered.
Unifying the rights in section 106 would avoid the lock-in of
vested industry players that has evolved out of the accreted nature
of copyright rights in the music industry. Because the statute iden185 See id. at 572 (noting that if too many exclusive licenses are issued "the perverse result
may well be that no one has the right to distribute the work on the Net.").
186 The obvious exception is sound recordings, which are not granted a general public
performance right. See discussion supra Section l.D.
187 See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2000). Section 106 begins by stating that the rights granted in
that section are "[s]ubject to sections 107 through 122." Id.
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tifies these separate and distinct rights, assignees of a particular
right correctly believe that any activity invades their statutorily
granted right. Under the present law, arrangements are made,
deals are struck, and licenses are written using the terminology of
the different sticks in the copyright owner's bundle: reproduction,
distribution, public performance, etc. If the copyright owner's
bundle were conceived of not as a bundle of limited sticks, but
more as a field of grass with each blade representing a different
way to commercially exploit the copyrighted expression, then arrangements might begin to take shape around distinct markets, not
distinct rights.
Equally important, as new ways to exploit works arise, there
will be new blades of grass to be licensed. These new licenses will
be structured around the new markets, not around pre-existing
rights specified in an outdated statute.
The proposed unified "right to commercially exploit the copyrighted expression" is not a suggestion that we return to the system
of indivisible copyright ownership that prevailed under the 1909
Act. The problems associated with the doctrine of indivisibility
are well documented, 88 and the doctrine was rejected with good
cause. Under the proposed unified commercial exploitation right,
exclusive licensees should continue to have standing to sue, the
right to claim copyright, and the ability to record their assignments.1 89 These rights are currently afforded to exclusive licensees
and should continue to be.
Allowing a unified right to be sublicensed could permit similar problems of overlapping ownership claims to arise. There is a
simple solution that would permit sublicensing and yet avoid the
pitfalls associated with the current overlap of rights. If copyright
owners were granted a unified "right to commercially exploit" the
copyrighted work, they could still assign to others the right to engage in certain activities, and certainly those grants could be on an
exclusive basis. If the assignee were also granted the right to authorize others to engage in that activity, then downstream users
could obtain permission from that assignee. Problems might arise,
however, if two or more assignees felt their respective exclusive
licenses encompassed a downstream use, and the downstream user
only obtained authorization from one of them.
One solution is to permit an absolute defense by the downstream user of authorization by an entity that possessed the power
188 See, e.g., NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 80, at § 10.01 [C] (discussing standing to sue,
right to claim copyright and recordation of assignments).
189 17 U.S.C. § 201(d)(2).
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to grant the authorization. 90 In that case, the non-authorizing exclusive licensee is really complaining that the license it obtained
from the copyright owner was not exclusive after all. That would
be a dispute with the copyright owner, not with the downstream
user. 191 These would be disputes about contract language, not disputes concerning statutory interpretation.
This solution is not particularly satisfying if the licenses continue to be designed around and drafted using traditional rightsstyled language. For example if Company B is granted the exclusive right to commercially exploit the copyrighted work by means
of reproduction and distribution, and Company C is granted the
exclusive right to commercially exploit the copyrighted work
through public performances, the overlapping claims will be similar to those impeding dissemination of copyrighted music today.
Unifying the rights granted to a copyright owner would hopefully encourage the parties to contract in terms of markets, not in
terms of specified means of exploitation. To return to the blades
of grass metaphor, exclusive licensees would be given control over
particular patches of grass in the copyright owner's field. As new
means of exploitation develop, we may see fights about whether
those new blades of grass are growing in Company B's patch of
exclusively licensed grass or in Company C's patch of exclusively
licensed grass. But, hopefully, because the patches of grass will be
defined in terms of markets, the blades of grass will not be growing in both patches at once. Alternatively, if the new method of
exploitation is within the bounds of both exclusive licensees, either
licensees should have the right to authorize the new use. It might
be worthwhile to explore imposing obligations similar to joint tenants on both licensees. Alternatively, a priority system, similar to
the one presently in the Copyright Act 19 could be used to resolve
these kinds of disputes.
D. Market Power
In addition to the problems that result from high transaction
costs and unclear entitlements, in the music industry there is the
very real problem of industry concentration. This market power
possessed by certain players in the music industry does not result
from the exclusive rights granted by the Copyright Act, although
190 The current statute has similar provisions. See 17 U.S.C. § 205(d), (e) (2000).
191 Alternatively, exploring the possibility of treating exclusive licensees who have rights
that both appear to encompass a new method' of exploitation as joint tenants may prove fruitful,
although it is beyond the scope of this Article.
192 17 U.S.C. § 205(d), (e) (2000).
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those rights are sometimes referred to as monopoly rights. Instead,
the market power is the result of the large quantity of copyrights
owned by each of these industry players. The power wielded by
the major record labels has been the subject of antitrust investigations and consent decrees in the past, 193 as have the practices of
both ASCAP and BMI. 194 The proposals outlined in this Article do
not specifically address the problems associated with the concentration of market power that would remain despite reformation of
the provisions discussed.
Any reformation of the Copyright Act should be mindful of
the potential for such market concentrations to create market failures. There have been examples of attempts within the Copyright
Act to guard against the abusive use of market power in the music
industry. The first is the mechanical license itself. Adopted to
assure that the Aeolian Company was not the only company to be
producing player piano rolls, the mechanical license remained in
the statute, and an entire industry grew up around it. One cannot
help but wonder what the music industry would be like today if the
competitive forces of the free market had been allowed to shape
the relationship between copyright owners in the musical works
and the creators of sound recordings.
A more recent example of copyright attempting to prevent the
abusive use of market power is in the voluntary mandatory licensing scheme of music webcasting. These restrictions are aimed
primarily at preventing extensive exclusive licensing arrangements
that would otherwise permit dominant players in one market from
extending that dominance into new distribution markets. 195 As opposed to a general prohibition on abusive licensing, the details currently in the statute provide certainty, allowing copyright owners
the freedom to employ other restrictive licensing practices that are
not prohibited by the statute. Perhaps some of these kinds of restrictions would be appropriate. However, because these restrictions impede free markets, Congress should tread carefully in this

193

See,. e.g., Alec Klein & Jonathan Krim, Online Music Ventures Probed: U.S. Opens

Antitrust Inquiry into Major Firms'Partnerships,THE WASHINGTON POST, Aug. 7, 2001, at E04
(investigating the MusicNet the venture backed by AOL Time Warner Inc., Bertelsmann AG,
EMI Group PLC, and RealNetworks Inc.; and Pressplay, backed by Sony Corp. and Vivendi
Universal SA).; Press Release, Federal Trade Commission, Record Companies Settle FTC
Charges of Restraining Competition in CD Music Market All Five Major DistributorsAgree to
Abandon Advertising PricingPolicies, (May 10, 2000) at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2000/05/
cdpres.htm.
194 See Einhom, supra note 51, at 349 (discussing a FTC settlement with the five largest
distributors of recorded music, over minimum advertised price programs).
195 See supra notes 108-10 and accompanying text.
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area. As we have seen in the past, entire industries can evolve
around these types of provisions despite outdated origins.
While antitrust laws remain an important check on abuse of
market power, proving market power, in the antitrust sense of the
phrase, can be difficult. In the music industry, however, there
in which the antitrust laws have been
have been several instances
96
used to reform behavior.
In addition to regulation by the antitrust laws, there are equitable doctrines that can keep the abuse of dominant market position in check. Specifically, the doctrine of copyright misuse could
play a major role in checking abusive licensing practices. The district court in the Napster case recently recognized industry practice
by the record labels in licensing their works for digital distribution
raised serious questions of misuse. 97 Under the misuse doctrine,
if a copyright owner is engaged in misuse, they may not enforce
their copyrights until the misuse is purged. The existence of the
doctrine, and the real threat of its application, provides some
measure of deterrence against abusive licensing practices, although
the misuse doctrine alone is probably not sufficient.
While antitrust laws can provide protection from abuse of
monopoly power, the proposals offered in this Article may encourage more competition within the music industry itself. By simplifying many of the statutory provisions relating to different aspects
of music copyright, the proposals offered here would lower the
barriers to entry, fostering greater competition. The reduction of
transaction costs for downstream users may also facilitate the appearance of new competitors. Under the simplified system proposed in this Article, new record labels may be able to profit by
quickly adapting to changing methods of dissemination, unencumbered by the current complex set of regulations.
CONCLUSION

Copyright risks irrelevancy in the digital world. This is particularly true for the music industry. The market created by the
existence of copyright in the first place has, over time, filled with
multiple owners and overlapping rights in a single copyrighted
work. The transaction costs associated with the downstream use of
music are naturally high because multiple works are needed for
marketable downstream use. If each one of those works continues
to require multiple clearances, the market will continue to fail as
See Einhorn, supra note 51.
197 In re Napster, Inc. Copyright Litigation, 191 F. Supp. 2d 1087, 1109 (N.D. Cal. 2002).
196
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new methods of exploitation are discovered. The additional fact of
market concentration in a limited number of entities compounds
the problem by creating unreasonable demand on price.
Reducing the number of parties from whom a downstream
user must obtain authorization by embracing the doctrine of derivative work independence and unifying the rights granted to
copyright owners would further the goals of copyright by facilitating market transactions thus allowing more rapid exploitation of
new methods of dissemination. While problems of market concentration would remain, the proposals offered in this Article would
begin to head copyright law in the right direction.

